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Interested in getting published in the  
Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War 
Era? 
 
If you or anyone you know has written an 
undergraduate paper in the past five years about the 
Civil War Era or its lasting memory and meets the 
following categories and requirements then visit our 
website at http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/gcjcwe/ and 
enter your work for consideration for next year‘s 
publication. 
 
Requirements and Categories for Publication: 
 
 Should be written and submitted in a Word 
Document with Times New Roman, 12 point 
font 
 
 Include a submission page with the following 
information: your name, school, graduation 
year, and the date the paper was originally 
published 
 
1. Academic Essays: Original research with 
extensive use of primary and secondary sources. 
Possible topics include but are not limited to 
military history, social history, race, 
reconstruction, memory, reconciliation, politics, 
the home front, and etcetera. 6,000 words or 
under. 
 
2. Book Reviews: Any non-fiction Civil War related 
book published in the last two years. Authors 
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should have knowledge of the relevant literature 
to review. 700 words or under. 
 
3. Historical Non-fiction Essays: This category is for 
non-fiction works regarding the Civil War that 
are not necessarily of an academic nature. 
Examples of this include essays in public history 
of the war, study of the re-enactment culture, 
current issues in the Civil War field, etcetera 
Creativity is encouraged in this field as long as it 
remains a non-fiction piece. 2,000 to 6,000 
words. 
 
 
Any student with an interest in the Civil War may 
submit. This includes graduate students as long as 
the work submitted is undergraduate work written 
within the past five years. If your submission is 
selected, your work will be published online and in a 
print journal, which you will receive a copy of for 
your own enjoyment. 
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A Letter from the Editors 
 
It has been an absolute honor to serve as the 
editors of the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil 
War Era for the spring of 2014. Fielding and reading 
the scholarship of our peers in the field of the 
American Civil War never fails to be informative, 
and the width and breadth of article subjects 
submitted this year broadened our own interest and 
awareness of the numerous facets of the historical 
discipline as it has been applied to this seminal 
conflict in the development of our nation. Of 
seventeen total submissions, it was a trying task to 
select only five for final publication. We would like 
to extend our profuse gratitude for the tireless 
dedication of our associate editors, Valerie Merlina 
(‘14), Heather Clancy (‘15), Brianna Kirk (‘15), 
Thomas Nank (‘16), Kevin Lavery (‘16), and Steven 
Semmel (‘16), without whom this effort would have 
been exponentially more difficult. The guidance of 
our faculty advisor, Dr. Ian Isherwood, has also 
proven invaluable, as has his practice of letting us 
find our own way whenever possible. 
 The five pieces included herein are an 
eclectic mix of academic essays, book reviews, and 
interviews that showcase the diversity of Civil War 
Era Studies. This issue of the journal opens with 
―Freedmen with Firearms: White Terrorism and 
Black Disarmament During Reconstruction,‖ written 
by David Schenk of Marquette University, which 
deals with the oft-overlooked efforts of newly-freed 
African-Americans to violently resist the white 
supremacist oppression of the Reconstruction South. 
Next comes ―Île à Vache and Colonization: The 
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Tragic End of Lincoln's ‗Suicidal Folly,‘‖ written by 
Graham Welch of Georgetown University, in which 
the original plan for the foreign settlement of free 
blacks during the Civil War is examined in detail. 
The first of our book reviews, written by Brexton 
O‘Donnel of the University of Mary Washington, 
analyzes Bruce Levine‘s 2013 work The Fall of the 
House of Dixie, while the second, written by 
Heather Clancy of Gettysburg College, looks at 
Caroline Janney‘s 2013 book Remembering the Civil 
War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation. The 
journal closes with an exclusive interview with D. 
Scott Hartwig, the recently retired Supervisory 
Historian of Gettysburg National Military Park, 
wherein he reflects on his own career and what the 
future holds. 
 The entire process of compiling this issue has 
been filled with trials and tribulations, as is any 
editing job, and has assisted the both of us in 
realizing our editorial and academic potential. It is 
thus with the utmost pleasure that we present 
Volume 4 of the Gettysburg College Journal of the 
Civil War Era, and eagerly look forward to the 
publication of many more. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Bryan G. Caswell, Gettysburg College Class of 2015 
Peter S. D‘Arpa, Gettysburg College Class of 2014 
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Freedmen with Firearms: White Terrorism and 
Black Disarmament During Reconstruction   
David H. Schenk  
 Common American History 101 narratives of 
post-Civil War Reconstruction have generally included 
docile and helpless former slaves, who quietly adjusted to 
the oppressive governance and terror of white Southern 
peoples for nearly a century. This established narrative, 
however, obscures another possible reason why organized 
Freedmen gave up their fight for suffrage and basic civil 
rights. Congressional records describe the early years of 
Reconstruction with armed Freedmen communities 
successfully defending their rights against white Southern 
authorities and terrorist organizations. At the same time 
these records also reveal efforts by these same white 
Southern entities to systematically disarm African 
American citizens.  
 African Americans fought hard for their political 
and civil rights as new United States citizens, during a time 
when they were reasonably well-armed and could 
organize a viable resistance. In what could be described as 
the disarmament period, these firearms were confiscated 
through various means of violence and coercion. As a 
result, the political agency of Freedmen was greatly 
diminished, and the consequences are clearly represented 
by reduced Freedmen poll numbers during the later years 
of Reconstruction. Freedmen were largely willing to fight 
and die for their rights as new U. S. citizens as long as 
defiance remained a course of rational action. Disarmed 
and overpowered by the weaponry of their oppressors, 
10 
 
African Americans grudgingly resigned themselves to the 
politics of basic survival.     
       
 I. Voices of Authority and Insight 
Nearly a month after the end of the Civil War in 
May of 1865, Frederick Douglass addressed the 
American Anti-Slavery Society on the future of 
emancipated slaves. His tone was pessimistic because he 
understood the challenges that lay ahead, and he warned 
those in attendance that their work was not yet completed. 
Douglass expressed his greatest fear for former slaves 
living under white Southern authorities, explaining that 
―The black man has never had the right either to keep or 
bear arms; and the legislatures of the states will still have 
the power to forbid it.‖1What Douglass expressed here 
just weeks after the cessation of hostilities is the 
premonition of another conflict on the horizon. Freedom, 
citizenship, and the ability to vote were not enough to 
assuage Douglass‘ worst fears, because without the 
political agency of black firearm ownership, and by 
extension the threat of an organized uprising, the actions 
and policies of white authorities would have little restraint. 
The Federal government fell extremely short of 
securing the rights of freedmen, and Douglass saw this 
future reality far in advance. Perhaps he understood all 
too well the attitudes and indifference of the Northern 
public, and that, for political reasons, Washington could 
                                                          
1Frederick Douglass, ―The Need for Continuing Anti-Slavery 
Work Speech,‖ in the Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 
ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: International, 1975), 168. 
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not possibly fulfill the Reconstruction visions put forward 
by Radical Republicans like Thaddeus Stevens.
2
 Of 
course, Douglass‘ eloquent speaking ability and political 
pragmatism would preclude him from saying directly that 
white northerners essentially just did not care about the 
fate of Freedmen.    
The closest Douglass comes to this statement is 
so eloquently spoken that the meaning could be 
reasonably misconstrued. ―I think the American people 
are disposed often to be generous rather than just,‖ he 
declared, then proceeded to list benevolent organizations 
that have assisted African Americans. The questionable 
duration of this aid was tied to a post-war public sentiment 
and Douglass asked for something much more 
sustainable: ―What I ask for the Negro is not benevolence 
. . . but simply justice.‖3The great cause of the hour was 
peacetime philanthropy directed at millions of freed 
slaves, but the benefactors of these organizations were 
part of the same tiny minority of Abolitionist whites; the 
                                                          
2
Eric Foner, "Thaddeus Stevens, Confiscation, and 
Reconstruction," in Major Problems in the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, ed. Michael Perman. 2nd ed. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1998. Excerptfrom The Hofstadter Aegis: A 
Memorial. Edited by Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick. N.p.: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. 
3
 Frederick Douglass, "Frederick Douglass States the 
Freedmen's Demands, April 1865," in Major Problems in the 
Civil War and Reconstruction, ed. Michael Perman, 286-87. 
2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998. Excerpt from "From 
Frederick Douglass, Address to the Massachusetts Antislavery 
Society, April 1865," inNegro Social and Political Thought: 
Representative Texts, 1850 – 1920, ed. by Howard Brotz (Basic 
Books, 1966), 286-287. 
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same handful of people who would actually consider 
inviting Douglass into their homes as an honored guest.   
Douglass asked for the same constitutional 
protections given to all Americans, such as the right to 
assemble, speak, vote and own firearms. He stressed this 
key to the black citizen‘s autonomy in his April speech 
when he declared that, ―If the Negro cannot stand on his 
own legs, let him fall . . . all I ask is, give him a chance to 
stand on his own legs.‖4  The truth was that either through 
the Federal retreat from Reconstruction, or a growing 
condition of indifference, without the guarantee of justice 
former slaves would soon be completely defenseless in 
the former Confederacy. Organized citizens with firearms 
were the only protection against oppressive Southern 
authorities, and Douglass knew this long before 
Reconstruction ended and the last Freedmen‘s Bureau 
closed shop in 1877. The eventual creation and 
implementation of Jim Crow laws, through which 
discriminatory exclusions and restrictions controlled 
nearly every facet of African American life, embodied 
Douglass‘ worst-case outcomes for unarmed black 
communities.     
The post-Reconstruction South became the social 
nightmare Douglass had envisioned, and black journalist 
and activist Ida B. Wells reiterated his belief in armed 
black communities nearly thirty years later. 
Contemporary scholars consider Wells to be the mother 
of the Civil Rights movement because of her innovative 
and relentless approaches to racial violence and injustice. 
                                                          
4
 Ibid. 
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She publicized the horrors of epidemic lynching, led 
successful economic boycotts of white businesses, and 
revealed through her writings the harsh realities of late 19
th
 
century Southern racism. In Southern Horrors: Lynch 
Law In All Its Phases, Wells describes the only defense 
available for black citizens: 
 The only case where the proposed lynching did 
not occur, was where the men armed themselves in 
Jacksonville, Fla., and Paducah, Ky., and prevented it. 
The only times an Afro-American who was assaulted got 
away has been when he had a gun and used it in self-
defense.
5
 
Wells had extensive knowledge of white 
terrorism throughout the whole of the U.S., and she 
concluded that an armed black population was the only 
means of immediate justice.     
 Wells‘ primary mission was spreading the truth 
through the press and educating both the national and 
global public, but the extensive amount of violence and 
death demanded a far more archaic solution. Changes 
would come—that was the heart of her crusade for 
justice—but the life of a single black citizen was precious 
and irreplaceable. Wells assessed that ―a Winchester rifle 
should have a place of honor in every black home. . . .  
When the white man . . . knows he runs as great a risk of 
biting the dust every time his Afro-American victim does, 
he will have a greater respect for Afro-American 
                                                          
5
 Ida B. Wells, "Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its 
Phases," 1892, inSouthern Horrors and Other Writings: The 
Anti-Lynching Campaign of Ida B. Wells, 1892-1900, ed. 
Jacqueline Jones Royster (Boston: Bedford Books, 1997), 70. 
14 
 
life.‖6This violent conclusion reveals the realities of Wells‘ 
lifetime, where black citizens were dehumanized by much 
of white American society. This is evident in Wells‘ 
detailed accounts of lynching where the victims were 
treated in the most horrific and torturous manner. 
Postcards from photographs of public lynching were 
widely produced, marketed and sold to the general 
public.
7
The attitudes of white Americans are conveyed 
through their general indifference to these images that 
were widely available at the time through the activism of 
Wells and others.    
A question emerges from the thirty years between 
Douglass‘ and Wells‘ statements; what happened to all 
the firearms that were in the homes of Freedmen and 
former Union soldiers? Congressional testimony reveals 
substantial amount of firearm ownership among African 
American communities during the early years of 
Reconstruction and a population willing to brandish them 
in protest and self-defense.     
The importance of firearms that Douglass and 
Wells stress is insightful because quiet, helpless, and 
docile black communities—those commonly found in 
mainstream Reconstruction narratives—would never 
dream of pointing loaded weapons at their white 
neighbors. The will among blacks to resist and fight back, 
however, was strong before and during the Civil War, and 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Without Sanctuary: Photographs and Postcards of Lynching in 
America, http://withoutsanctuary.org/main.html, Dec. 4, 2013. 
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the period of Reconstruction and beyond was no 
different.      
During the antebellum period, slave uprisings did 
occur, such as the highly publicized 1831 Nat Turner 
revolt and John Brown‘s raid on Harpers Ferry. Because 
of informants, however, most revolts were typically 
prevented while still in the planning stage, with deadly 
consequences for the conspirators. Slaves regularly risked 
life and limb to escape to freedom in the North, and 
when the opportunity to enlist in the Union Army and 
Navy arose, 179,000 black soldiers and 10,000 black 
sailors joined the fight.
8
In fact the fear of slave uprisings 
was so great that in antebellum Louisiana the penalty for a 
white person caught speaking or writing anything 
promoting a slave revolt could be imprisoned for decades 
or even executed.
9
These laws were generally aimed at 
white northern abolitionists who had intentionally brought 
their religious and moral crusades directly into the slave 
holding states.       
If millions of slaves were as docile and helpless as 
current scholarship contends, it would take far more than 
a white Yankee orator to instigate a full-scale uprising. 
The often-violent backlash against abolitionist speech in 
the antebellum South may have simply been an 
overreaction, but on the other hand slave patrols and 
local militias, which stood as a defense against mass slave 
                                                          
8
James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 3rd ed.(Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education, 2001), 383. 
9
Ibid., 52. 
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insurrections, were very common throughout the South in 
this pre-Civil War period.      
Four million slaves were a powder keg of 
discontentment both before and during the Civil War, 
and it will be demonstrated that this African American 
spirit of rebellion did not simply end during 
Reconstruction. The body of evidence to this effect 
resides in congressional records and other various written 
documents. In Africa, traditions and histories are 
generally oral and hereditary in their storage and 
transmission, unlike the meticulous systems of Western 
recordkeeping, with books, libraries, and archives.
10
These 
traditional oral histories also exist in North American 
black communities, and run a quiet and parallel path to 
the mainstream collections of written scholarship.   
One such example is revealed in the famous 
autobiography of Ralph Ellison, entitled Invisible Man, 
which reveals a hidden story pertinent to the disarmament 
of Freedmen. Ellison opens his narrative as a child at the 
deathbed of his grandfather, who in his younger years was 
an emancipated slave in the Deep South. Ellison focuses 
on the dying words of his grandfather, which confess an 
unforgivable cowardice and betrayal against his own 
African American peoples. Speaking his last words to 
Ellison‘s father he asks him to do what he was never able 
to do in a lifetime:Son, after I‘m gone I want you to keep 
up the good fight. I never told you, but our life is a war 
and I have been a traitor all my borndays, a spy in the 
                                                          
10
 Aran S. MacKinnon, The Making of South Africa: Culture 
and Politics (Pearson:Boston, 2004), 330-333. 
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enemy‘s country ever since I gave up my gun back in the 
Reconstruction. Live with your head in the lion‘s mouth. I 
want you to overcome ‗em with yeses, undermine ‗em 
with grins, agree ‗em to deathand destruction, let ‗em 
swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open.
11
   
After disarmament the politics of basic survival 
replaced the active fight for real freedom, and Ellison‘s 
grandfather never forgave himself for this surrender. 
These were not simply the incoherent ramblings of a 
dying old man, because the family reaction clearly 
demonstrated a buried truth among the African American 
descendants of Reconstruction. Ellison was extremely 
bothered by his grandfather‘s last words because they 
established a strong motivational basis for his later 
introspections on black manhood. According to Ellison, 
the effect on his parents was equally potent, and he 
explains that these last words had a greater effect on them 
than the actual death of his grandfather. Ellison recalls, ―I 
was warned emphatically to forget what he had said and 
indeed, this is the first time it has been mentioned outside 
the family circle.‖12Ellison reveals a well-kept family secret, 
which may in fact be an isolated incident with merely one 
Freedman giving up his firearm to white authorities, but it 
may also present a rare glimpse into a larger hidden story 
of Reconstruction.     
                                                          
11
 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, 1994 Modern Library ed. (New 
York: Random House, 1994), 15-16. 
12
 Ibid. 
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The reaction by Ellison‘s parents suggests there is 
a substantially negative aspect to this confession, one that 
might be very harmful to either family pride, or traditional 
community narratives concerning the Reconstruction 
period. There is nothing particularly shameful about a 
single Freedman giving up his firearm to overpowering 
Southern authorities. There would be little alternative to 
do so in the face of such certain and deadly 
circumstances, and this event would leave little if anything 
to ponder and regret years later on one‘s deathbed. A 
more reasonable conclusion is that Ellison‘s grandfather 
was one Freedman among many who realized too late 
what was happening on a larger scale. The opportunity for 
armed resistance quickly passed away one firearm at a 
time, until the only remaining action was to be a traitorous 
black man like Ellison‘s grandfather saw himself as: 
forever smiling and acquiescing to the enemy just to 
survive.   
The confession from Ellison‘s grandfather is not 
significant in itself, but it does lend credibility to the 
congressional testimony that will follow. A family secret 
revealed through the rare autobiography of a mid-
twentieth century African American author might prove 
to be as equally scarce. Yet, if the mass disarmament of 
Freedman has been buried in the collective closet of the 
African American consciousness, then Ellison‘s 
recollection becomes merely the tip of the iceberg. The 
only evidence to this effect exists in congressional 
testimony compiled directly during the middle of the 
twelve-year Reconstruction period (1865-1877).    
19 
 
II. Terror and Disarmament: The Official Record 
       
 The 42
nd
 U.S. Congress conducted extensive 
hearings in 1871-1872 because of the growing threat of 
terror organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan.
13
 The 13 
volume published report is called Affairs In the Late 
Insurrectionary States, and it records the detailed 
testimony of victims, perpetrators, and witnesses. The 
findings reveal the attitudes and actions of African 
Americans living under the constant threat of violence 
and intimidation. Black citizens were not alone because 
white Republicans, Yankee businessmen, and 
schoolteachers at black schools were also terrorized. 
Testimony from the state of Mississippi reveals these 
tangled lines of intimidation as Southern Democratic 
powers worked to regain full control of their home state. 
     
African American voices are largely absent from 
the hearings, and this is simply the product of their low 
standing in the nineteenth century U.S., but the testimony 
of white associates and neighbors reveal an angry and 
active black community. Joseph F. Galloway, a white 
schoolteacher at St. Mary‘s Academy near Caledonia, 
Mississippi, had regular encounters with the Ku Klux 
Klan and testified about reactions from the black 
community. The Klan believed that Galloway influenced 
the political thoughts of his black pupils,and they wanted 
him to stop teaching and leave the area. He refused to do 
so and gained a position of leadership among the black 
community.       
                                                          
13
McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 609. 
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Terrorism had been increasing lately and a group 
of local black leaders approached him and asked him ―if 
there is not some way to get rid of these Ku Klux,‖ and he 
replied that they would have to rely on government forces 
to do that.
14
The men were not satisfied with his answer 
and one angrily replied that ―they had waited on the 
Government of the United States a good while now, and 
were getting killed and whipped and abused all around. . . 
.  They would have to take it into their own 
hands.‖15These Freedmen were not cowering like 
frightened children from the regular Klan raids, but rather 
they were very anxious to fight back somehow. They 
approached the educated schoolteacher for guidance or a 
plan of action, because they had the will to resist and the 
weapons to do so. What they needed, however, was good 
strategy from someone who could reasonably formulate 
such things. Galloway refused to condone violence and 
continued to discourage armed resistance, but eventually 
he did admit that a firearm served as a strong deterrent 
against Klan attacks.      
The inquiry of terror continued along the lines of 
resistance and the chairman of the committee asked a 
leading follow up question to Mr. Galloway: ―These 
ghostly fellows are afraid of arms, are they?‖ Galloway 
replied, ―Yes, sir; very much so,‖ and he described an 
incident where Klan members learned that their intended 
victim was carrying a pistol. ―They went up to Caledonia 
                                                          
14
The Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States: 
Mississippi, Vol. II, S. Rep. No. 42
nd
-No. 41, pt. 12, 2d Sess. 
(1871), 670. 
15
Ibid., 671. 
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and left. They found that he had his arms that night and 
went back and told them that it would not do any good to 
whip him, so they let him off.‖16This line of questioning 
was intended to either learn the mettle of Klansmen, or to 
showcase their cowardice to a larger audience. The clear 
point in either case was that the Klan was afraid of armed 
Freedmen, and this may explain the focused acts of 
disarmament that are revealed in later testimony.    
The targeting of isolated and unarmed individuals 
becomes apparent throughout later testimony, but this 
does not mean that these white terrorists remained static 
in their approach. Defenseless individuals would remain 
the primary victims, but the systematic disarmament of 
not so helpless Freedmen would become the first order of 
business on nightly raids. Testimony from Captain 
George W. Yates of the U.S. 7
th
 Calvary described two 
disturbing instances of firearm confiscation followed by 
cold-blooded murder. The first altercation dealt with a 
black woman seeking justice through Union Army 
channels, and Yates relayed the incident in detail. ―An 
armed band had visited her house. . . .She said they came 
for arms, and [her husband] did not have anything but an 
old gun. . . . They made him bring it out, and while in the 
act of bringing it out he was shot.‖17    
The second incident he described, which took 
place just a few miles away, was even more brutal: ―She 
said the party came there, several people that they called 
for arms, and finally killed her husband and told her to go 
                                                          
16
Ibid.,673. 
17
Ibid.,793. 
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to bed.‖18 The Klansmen then proceeded burn the house 
to the ground, which incinerated her husband‘s body and 
killed their two children. Violence was escalating along 
with the disarmament of Freedmen, and the reasons for 
this are unclear. It could have been due to increasing 
hostilities, or merely meant to affect the black turnout in 
an upcoming election, but the record does not provide 
any explanation. 
Senseless acts of violence committed against 
Freedmen must have been the accepted reality for the 
congressmen conducting the inquiry, because they did not 
press for reasons or motivations. The hunt to capture and 
prosecute white terrorists takes center stage, and the 
otherwise highly detailed record suffers from an 
overemphasis on this objective at the expense of other 
aspects of Reconstruction such as the sociopolitical 
climate of the South. The Ku Klux Klan takes on 
superhuman characteristics because of the often tabloid 
quality of the hearings.       
Secret Klan handshakes, disguises, and oaths are 
treated with fascination and all the depth of inquiry found 
in a developing conspiracy theory. The hearings dwell on 
the disputed level of nudity a white woman was in when 
law enforcement officers entered her bedchamber, and 
this line of inquiry comes across like an example of 
Victorian era pornography. A century and a half removed 
from these hearings, the attitudes and values of this time 
period come across as extremely strange in contrast with 
contemporary sensibilities.    
                                                          
18
Ibid. 
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Black communities were living in terror, and in 
many instances actively resisting oppression, but the 
Congressional Record more than often treats them like 
inanimate objects. Armed freedmen were fighting back, 
and efforts were underway to disarm them, yet all of this 
remains at the extreme periphery of these congressional 
documents. This struggle, however, emerges from the 
testimony line by line when searching for Freedmen, 
firearms, and conflict.   
Testimony demonstrates that citizens were 
generally well-armed in the Mississippi city of Meridian 
and that a general state of hostilities existed between black 
and white citizens. Klansmen had been coming over the 
border from Alabama terrorizing and attacking freedmen, 
while local white authorities did little to stop them. Riots 
had occurred with a portion of the town set to fire, and 
subsequent trials and arrests further intensified the 
violence. A white citizen of Meridian, M.H. Whitaker, 
provided extensive testimony concerning the condition of 
unrest and the anger of black citizens. ―Large squads of 
colored people were seen about in portions of the town in 
an organized form, with arms,‖ he described, and when 
the freedmen were questioned about the reason for state 
of armed readiness, they explained that ―they were going 
to fight the white people: if they wanted a fight.‖19 The 
testimony does not focus on the motivations of the armed 
freedmen, but it clearly demonstrates the general 
numbers of weapons in their possession    
                                                          
19
The Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States: 
Mississippi, Vol. I, S. Rep. No. 42nd - No. 41, pt. 11, 2d Sess. 
(1871), 172. 
24 
 
      
 Whitaker surmised the count by comparison: 
―White people always had arms, always kept one or two 
guns about their premises, for squirrel hunting and bird 
hunting. The colored people all have guns, I suppose, for 
the same purpose.‖20 The common ownership of firearms 
by freedmen is not isolated to Meridian, and later 
evidence will demonstrate the expanse of an armed black 
population across the former Confederate States. A 
quantitative analysis after a century and a half is 
impossible in all likelihood, but since this testimony is a 
consistent sampling of a Reconstruction trend, it must 
represent something much larger in scope.   
Miles away from Meridian in Brooksville, 
Mississippi, the story of armed Freedmen is quite similar, 
but with an added element of coordinated firearm 
confiscation. Former rebel soldier John R. Taliaferro 
testified in depth concerning his relations with freedmen 
and the Ku Klux Klan. He was not a member of the Klan, 
but rather was a plantation owner who employed former 
slaves. Taliaferro was questioned by congressman John 
Coburn as to whether freedmen were the majority 
population in the county and if they were all armed, and 
Taliaferro replied to both in the affirmative and added, 
―All the negroes who work for me, pretty much—have 
shot-guns or something of that Kind.‖21    
The follow up question concerned the 
disarmament of these freedmen by the Ku Klux Klan, 
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and Taliaferro replied, ―Yes sir; they have taken away 
pistols and things of that kind from them. . . . Thirty or 
forty pistols.‖22 He denied there was any form of 
organized system of firearm confiscation, and that mass 
disarmaments only took place after riots.    
In later testimony, however, he makes mention of 
a General Forrest coming down from West Point 
Mississippi to calm down the population of Brooksville. 
Another General followed this visit from West Point who 
conducted a large-scale disarmament of freedmen. 
Taliaferro recalled the event and qualifies the soldiers as 
former Confederates. ―That was the occasion the when 
the Negroes were disarmed,‖ he explained, "by captain 
Franks, with his company from West Point. They came 
down, of course, as citizen soldiers.‖23 The Confederate 
army had been disbanded and outlawed as part of the 
terms of surrender, but they were reorganized and had 
participated in local affairs such as the confiscation of 
firearms.       
 It is unclear whether this was in fact Nathan 
Bedford Forrest, the first national leader and Grand 
Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan,
24
 but this testimony referred 
to events taking place around 1869 and this would be just 
a year after the time when General Forest and other 
former Confederate officers transformed the Ku Klux 
Klan from a ―harmless fraternal order‖ into a ―hooded 
terrorist organization‖ that James McPherson describes as 
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―The military arm of the Democratic party.‖25The 
presiding congressmen did not follow up this 
disarmament testimony with any questions at all, and the 
line of inquiry instantly shifted to the Mississippi public 
school system, or lack thereof. If this was in fact General 
Forest and his followers in action, and this may never be 
known, then the newly organized and nationalized Klan 
had disarmed Freedmen during broad daylight in 
Brooksville, Mississippi. If this is the case, then white 
terrorists dressed down as common citizen soldiers did 
their most important work toward subjugating Freedmen, 
and the U. S. Congress did not even take notice. The 
testimony from Mississippi demonstrated some evidence 
of systematic firearm confiscation, but across the border 
in Alabama blatant and violent acts of disarming 
Freedmen reached near epidemic proportions.   
   
The act of disarmament appears at first to be 
political in nature, and intended primarily to affect the 
outcome of elections in favor of Democrats. Freedmen 
voted in overwhelming numbers for Republican 
candidates and the party of Lincoln was deeply despised 
by white citizens throughout the former Confederate 
States. This sentiment is clear and understandable for 
those recently defeated in the Civil War and struggling to 
restore a cohesive working order to their society. The 
fundamental Southern hatred of Yankees, Republicans, 
and Freedmen communities are not at issue here, but 
rather the lasting effects of disarmament in the way of 
long-term black political agency lost, and white racial 
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oppression completely unfettered.    
 Testimony from Alabama presents a closer look 
at the Ku Klux Klan in action and a well-armed 
community of oppressed African Americans. Freedmen 
had the will to fight and the armaments to do just that, but 
what they lacked in hindsight was an educated leadership 
that could form a qualitative plan of militant action. 
Previous testimony describes a white schoolteacher 
Galloway approached by freedmen in search of a strategy 
for resistance to the Ku Klux Klan. White authorities and 
their clandestine terrorist groups already had a plan in 
motion to subjugate African Americans, the testimony 
from Alabama offers a glimpse into these disarmament 
operations.     
The pages of testimony in Volume II Alabama 
are so full of firearm confiscation incidents that they are 
much too numerous to be listed here. The pattern begins 
in the nighttime when masked and armed white men 
arrive at homes or plantations where freedmen reside. 
They demand under threats that any guns on the 
premises be brought out and surrendered to them. When 
this is accomplished through force, or merely the threat of 
violence, then the African American residents are 
generally abused, beaten, or murdered.    
  
There are exceptions that hint of a more 
organized and focused operation aimed merely at 
disarming freedmen with minimal incidents of violence 
being committed. George Cornelous worked at a 
plantation in Madison County and gave a sworn affidavit 
that described a streamlined raid one night. Twelve 
28 
 
Klansmen confiscated firearms from freedmen on his 
plantation and another one nearby, and he described 
their intended objective:―They also examined all the 
houses for money, and asked if we knew who had guns, 
pistols, and money.‖26The incident comes across as a 
robbery because the objective seemed to be the search for 
valuables and cash. Firearms can hold a significant value 
depending on the condition and model, and these 
Klansmen were probably of the mercenary variety. The 
outcome of disarmament, however, was the same because 
as Cornelous described in the aftermath of this raid, 
―There is not a colored man in the Big Cove that had a 
gun or pistol, they all having been taken by the Ku 
Klux.‖27       
    
Not all nightly raids by the Klan went so orderly, 
and these instances demonstrate why the disarmament of 
freedmen was so important for white Southern interests to 
prevail. After learning of a Klan attack at a neighboring 
plantation a group of armed freedmen, in anticipation of 
being next, set up an ambush for the sixteen approaching 
Klansmen. Second Lieutenant John C. Bateman of the 
Union Army described the negative outcome for the 
white terrorists: ―The Negroes returned the fire, 
wounding, it is supposed, three of the party. . . . The 
disguised men broke and ran, and were pursued by the 
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negroes about a quarter of a mile.‖28 In the confusion of 
retreat one Klansmen was killed by friendly fire, and the 
others were most likely galvanized to enact the future 
disarmament of freedmen by any means necessary.   
    
 Nightly raids and terror campaigns were very 
common throughout Alabama, but not all forms of 
firearm confiscation were this piecemeal in method. A 
Freedmen‘s Bureau worker, John H. Wagner, who had 
been living in Alabama since the end of the war, 
presented evidence of a large-scale disarmament 
operation. He described from secondhand accounts what 
happened to all the confiscated arms from in and around 
Huntsville: ―It seems that along in 1868, they would go to 
a house and ask a Negro where his gun was; they knew he 
had one. . . . They would say, ‗you have got one, we will 
give you until such a day to take it to Markham‘s mill and 
deposit it there.‘‖29This systematic method of firearm 
confiscation was far different than the nightly raids, and 
according to Wagner was also more effective: ―One old 
man went to the mill, and he said he saw a thousand 
stored there. Very often they would take the guns from 
the Negroes and break them.‖30 This testimony identifies 
a form of disarmament that does not reflect the robbery 
and terror motivations of previous accounts. There was a 
basic line of reasoning behind this organized operation 
and Wagner addressed this question directly: ―I suppose 
that the object was to keep the Negroes down. They 
                                                          
28
Ibid., 1224. 
29
Ibid., 935. 
30
 Ibid. 
30 
 
thought they had no right to have guns. That is what they 
say to them.‖31This testimony is from just one county and 
does not prove a nationalized conspiracy, but within the 
halls of Congress this issue was becoming central to the 
politics of Reconstruction.      
III. Armed Freedmen Under the U.S. Constitution 
Klansmen and Southern authorities did their best 
to maintain secrecy in the confiscation of firearms and 
subjugation of African American citizens. Radical 
Republicans in Washington, however, already had a clear 
grasp on this disarmament practice and worked hard to 
introduce new protective legislation. These progressive 
politicians were generally from the pre-emancipation 
ranks of abolitionists. They perceived African Americans 
as fully human and fully equal citizens, and their 
Reconstruction plans included the redistribution of land 
and wealth to these former slaves.
32
The leading Radical 
Republican Thaddeus Stevens, a Congressman from 
Pennsylvania, was so extreme in his egalitarian politics 
that ―when he died in 1868, he was buried in a black 
cemetery because the main cemetery in Lancaster PA 
refused to accept blacks.‖33 Stevens did not live to see the 
dismal end of Reconstruction, but his beliefs and tenacity 
set the tone for Radical Republicans who battled hard for 
the rights of African Americans. 
Among these Radical advocates for former slaves 
was Congressman Benjamin F. Butler from 
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Massachusetts, a former Union general and a strong 
supporter of freedmen‘s rights. He introduced a bill that 
would guarantee the Second Amendment
34
 right for 
African Americans to keep and bear arms. Butler‘s work 
would form the basis for what became the famous anti-Ku 
Klux Klan Act, which has since been referred to in 
contemporary legal circles as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Legal scholar Stephen P. Halbrook concludes from his 
examination of the Butler bill it is clear that ―the Second 
Amendment guarantee was the only provision in the Bill 
of Rights mentioned by name‖35in the 1871 act. This 
landmark legislation was passed to protect the civil rights 
of freedmen with a strong focus on the right for them to 
keep and bear arms. Halbrook is an avid gun rights 
advocate, and this may taint the scholarship, but given the 
limited work on this subject material it has been included 
with a disclaimer. His conclusion appears reasonable 
enough, however, because in 1871, the remnants of 
Union forces and understaffed Freedmen‘s Bureaus were 
not sufficient to protect African Americans from white 
terrorist organizations. The Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteed the full rights of citizenship, at least to all male 
freedmen, and the anti-Ku Klux Klan Act should have 
provided a greater degree of jurisdiction for the 
enforcement of Federal laws including Second 
Amendment protections.    
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The events in Mississippi and Alabama were 
being repeated all across the southern United States. 
Justification for the Butler bill in the Congressional 
Record recorded that 2
nd
 Amendment violations were 
being enacted by legal authorities, ―In Union County 
[South Carolina], where all the negro population were 
disarmed by the sheriff only a few months ago . . . five 
hundred masked men rode at night and murdered and 
otherwise maltreated the ten persons who were in jail in 
that county.‖36Armed freedmen otherwise could defend 
their family and neighbors awaiting trial for any number 
of alleged crimes, but the confiscation of firearms in 
South Carolina meant that many freedmen would not 
survive to receive a constitutionally guaranteed trial by 
jury.        
It is not surprising that these violent acts took 
place, because in both the North and the South, the post-
Civil War white public was generally indifferent to the 
struggles of freed slaves. What is unusual is the strong 
push by white radical Republicans to secure the rights and 
liberties of freedmen, because their voting constituencies 
would not have directly demanded these actions in any 
great numbers. These actions may also have hurt the 
chances of certain Republicans for reelection, but 
indifference to the struggles of southern blacks was 
generally the prevailing attitude of the day. The right to 
defend oneself is fundamental among philosophical and 
legal circles, and so the denial of Second Amendment 
rights to freedmen would be reasonably troubling for 
Republicans or anyone who perceived blacks as fellow 
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human beings. These congressional battles for the benefit 
of a greatly marginalized black population are an example 
of bold progressive thinking put into the praxis of 
legislation. Federal law was all that Washington politicians 
could reasonably wield against restored Southern powers, 
and radical Republicans did their best against the 
prevailing political winds.   
Not surprisingly, representatives from former 
Confederate slaveholding states disagreed with the 
protections found in the Butler bill. The argument put 
forward was that the federal government had disarmed 
the white southern populations and unleashed black 
militias against them.
37
  This was generally not true, of 
course, but it did serve to support an argument that could 
not be readily disproved on the floor of the Congress. 
There were black militias formed throughout the South, 
armed by Federal and local governments, and there were 
some incidents,
38
 but they were rarely if ever used by states 
with Republican-controlled Governors. In fact, the 
opposite was generally the case.
39
   
When the war was over, tens of thousands of 
black Union veterans returned to the South, but first they 
purchased and kept their army muskets. But according to 
Republican Representative George McKee from 
Mississippi, they did not keep them very long. ―I have 
seen those muskets taken from them and confiscated 
under this Democratic law. The United States did not 
                                                          
37
Ibid., 126. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 606-607. 
34 
 
even protect the soldier in retaining the musket which it 
had given him [during the war], and which he had borne 
in its defense.‖40His point was that southern governments 
should not be allowed to infringe on the rights of new 
black citizens, and that legislation was desperately needed 
to insure that this erosion of Civil Rights did not continue.  
Butler debated fiercely for the passage of his bill, 
because the confiscation of firearms was only the 
beginning ofan organized oppression. The violence he 
feared would otherwise continue and become grossly one-
sided with white terrorists and authorities subjugating 
legally free citizens. In fact, in 1871, the line between law 
enforcement and terrorism was often crossed. To make 
this point, Butler read a troubling letter from Tennessee. 
―The Ku Klux fired on them through the window one of 
the bullets striking a colored woman. . . . The colored 
men then fired on the Ku Klux, and killed their leader. . . 
. He was identified, and proved to be ‗Pat Inman,‘ a 
constable and deputy sheriff.‖41Allowing local state 
ordinances and law enforcement the autonomy to dictate 
firearm restrictions was certainly not acceptable according 
to Butler.      
Southern politicians and Northern Democrats 
argued at length, and through concessions the Butler bill 
continued to be stripped down to the point it became 
ineffective at protecting the Second Amendment rights of 
freedmen. There were provisions initially included 
making it a federal crime to unlawfully confiscate firearms 
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from legal citizens. Representative Washington 
Whitthorne from Tennessee argued against the provision 
using an absurd example. ―If a police officer . . . should 
find a drunken negro or white man upon the streets with 
a loaded pistol flourishing it . . . [and if] he takes it away, 
the officer may be sued because the right to bear arms is 
secured by the Constitution.‖42The powers to interpret 
Second Amendment protections were eventually 
surrendered to state and local ordinances. The watered-
down Butler bill, which became the Civil Rights Act of 
1971, was not specific enough in its language, and this 
allowed for a wide range of future Supreme Court rulings. 
      
 The armed conflict between freedmen and white 
terrorists was part of a struggle by white citizens to restore 
the old Southern order. This top-down, white-dominated 
society would resemble the antebellum South in every 
way possible if they had their way. Plantations filled with 
subservient black workers would fill the landscape once 
again, and the proper social orders would be restored to 
their former glory. The greatest obstacles remaining as the 
Reconstruction era wound to a close were Yankee 
carpetbaggers, Scalawags, Republicans and, of course, 
armed freedmen.
43
Federal prosecutions against Klansmen 
succeeded in some states, but the vast stretch of southern 
territory and webs of local authorities made it nearly 
impossible to impose federal law in the former 
Confederacy.    
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Legal scholars had engaged the Fourteenth 
Amendment
44
 with caution before by its passage, because 
the central flaw of this constitutional correction was that 
Federal authorities could not readily enforce it. The dean 
of the New York University Law School, John Norton 
Pomeroy engaged the issue in 1868, and his writing 
presents an ominous preview of the Jim Crow South.   
The Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal 
constitutional protections for all citizens, and Pomeroy 
believed that it was the only viable solution for 
discriminatory practices in the Reconstruction South. The 
example he put forward focused on the Second 
Amendment and equal treatment, because according to 
how he interpreted this law, individual states could simply 
create discriminatory regulations ―by which certain classes 
of inhabitants—say Negroes—are required to surrender 
their arms, and are forbidden to keep and bear them 
under certain penalties.‖45The 14th Amendment did pass, 
but it too retained the great impediment of being 
extremely difficult to enforce. It did, however, open up 
the means for more meaningful action when mass transit 
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and media exposed the southern United States to greater 
scrutiny in the mid-twentieth century.  
The Fourteenth Amendment did have an early 
day in court, one that tested the meaning of Federal 
enforcement of the right of citizens to keep and bear 
arms. The case originated with the infamous Colfax 
Massacre in Louisiana in 1873, which was a protracted 
battle between black militiamen and white terrorists. 
Armed freedmen defended themselves at the Colfax 
courthouse, against a much larger white force, after 
disputed election results had erupted into violence. 
Negotiations failed and the white mob set fire to the 
courthouse, shooting anyone who tried to escape from the 
fire.
46
 The violent incident created a string of legal battles 
that went right up to the U.S. Supreme Court. Federal 
jurisdiction in the matter was strongly disputed, and this 
legal hurdle overshadowed the substance of both the 
incident and constitutionality of the massacre.   
 The establishment of federal police powers was 
too much of a stretch for the Supreme Court, and the 
U.S. v. Cruikshank decision came down on the side of 
state‘s rights.47 According to legal scholar Saul Cornell the 
verdict set the legal tone for the Second Amendment for 
the whole of the twentieth century. The states' rights 
argument flows directly into the collective rights school, 
where firearm laws are left to individual state 
governments.
48
 During Reconstruction and the following 
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decades, the decision of U.S. v. Cruikshank was 
devastating for African Americans, because while their 
rights as citizens were fully protected under Federal law, 
there was no tangible legal apparatus available to enforce 
these protections.     
The Supreme Court by its decision had oddly 
enough declared that the Federal enforcement of 
Constitutional law was in fact unconstitutional. This legal 
rift demonstrated the strange balance of power that 
existed between the states and Federal government during 
the nineteenth century. The same imbalances of legal 
authority that fermented the outbreak of the Civil War 
also created a legal minefield of absurdities that hampered 
Federal efforts towards Reconstruction.    
Conclusion 
The consequences of the American Civil War 
often resonate into present day society, and there are a 
few who readily recognize these indelible signs of this 
national tragedy. Scholars of the sectional conflict can 
often find themselves unable to read a daily domestic 
newspaper without finding something either distantly or 
intrinsically connected to the Civil War Era. The origins 
of this article, for example, are not the product of some 
tattered and worn archive document, but rather a 
contemporary Chicago Tribune article from 2010.
49
This 
article highlighted the numerous Reconstruction Era 
                                                          
49
 Colleen Mastony, "The Public Face of Gun Rights." Chicago 
Tribune (Chicago, IL), January 30, 2010, online 
edition. 
39 
 
examples used by Justice Clarence Thomas in a 
contemporary Second Amendment case. Justice Thomas 
is an African American justice who is often maligned for 
his politically conservative tendencies on the court. 
Regardless of his political leanings on gun rights, the legal 
battles he described did turn out to be accurate.   
Justice Thomas argued that the right of 19th 
century freedmen to bear arms in self-defense still 
remains central to the modern gun control debate. The 
United States Supreme Court had ruled in 2010 that the 
city of Chicago could not legally forbid its law-abiding 
citizens from owning handguns, and in an attempt to 
support this majority opinion Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas referenced events in the 
Reconstruction period.
50
The Court had originally ruled in 
1875, in the case of U.S. v. Cruikshank that Second 
Amendment rights were to be determined by individual 
state laws and that ―the 14th Amendment only required 
the states to apply their laws about arms bearing in a non-
discriminatory fashion.‖51     
Thomas recognized the gross deficiencies of this 
ruling because discrimination itself was the rule of law in 
the Reconstruction South. He warned against the court 
leaving 2nd Amendment constitutional interpretations to 
the jurisdiction of state governments because, as Thomas 
recalled, ―Without federal enforcement of the inalienable 
right to keep and bear arms, these militias and mobs were 
                                                          
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Saul Cornell, A Well Regulated Militia: The Founding 
Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America. (New 
York: Oxford UP, 2006), 194. 
40 
 
tragically successful in waging a campaign of terror against 
the very people the Fourteenth Amendment had just 
made citizens.‖52     
Thomas also speculated about the devastating 
effects of a Chicago-type civilian firearm ban and 
concluded that ―African-Americans in the South would 
likely have remained vulnerable to attack by many of their 
worst abusers: the state militia and state peace officers.‖53 
Reconstruction presented a dangerous ambiguity, because 
Southern law enforcement could simply turn its back on 
racial injustices, or as Justice Thomas suggested, become 
the lead perpetrators of violence against African 
Americans.       
The confiscation of firearms from Freedmen 
during Reconstruction remains a sparsely explored 
avenue of scholarship, and this article creates more 
questions than answers. Ascertaining the size, scope and 
organizational structures, of what appears to be a regional 
disarmament movement, would require a substantial 
amount of further research. The political implications 
alone could be staggering, because millions of African 
Americans were eliminated from local and national 
elections for nearly a century as a result of the 
disarmament period. Current historic narratives maintain 
that African Americans were simply frightened away from 
politics, but the evidence presented in this article explains 
the sudden, and largely tranquil race relations that 
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emerged during the late and post-Reconstruction eras.  
        
Ralph Ellison shared a family secret about his 
grandfather giving up his firearm during Reconstruction, 
and living as a traitor and spy behind the enemy lines of 
an ongoing war. Perhaps this account was fictionalized, or 
merely the distorted thoughts of a dying old man. What 
if, however, this really was a universally well-kept secret in 
the African American community, and was otherwise 
taken silently to millions of graves? This possibility would 
not be outside of the realm of reasonable scholarship, 
because the genuine history of oppressed and 
marginalized peoples is most commonly buried with 
them.        
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Île à Vache and Colonization: The Tragic End of 
Lincoln's ―Suicidal Folly‖ 
Graham Welch 
―I shall, if I get a sufficient number of you 
engaged, have provisions made that you shall not be 
wronged.‖54 These words from President Abraham 
Lincoln in 1862 would prove to be prophetic for all the 
wrong reasons when, in two years, 350 freed blacks and 
emigrants returned to the United State in tattered Union 
army uniforms, all victims of a disastrous attempt at 
settlement abroad on the Haitian island of Île à Vache.
55
 
A policy vision that existed from the embryonic days of 
the United States, the settlement of former slaves abroad 
had its opportunity in practice on the island under the 
aegis of the Lincoln administration and its representatives, 
all to collapse in a venture marred by disease, corruption, 
incompetence, and death. This event proved to have a 
significant effect on Lincoln, and ended a life-long 
exploration of colonization for both him and the nation. 
Through reconsideration following abject failure, Lincoln 
embraced policies of black inclusion that would have 
transformative impacts both on the Civil War and the 
nation going forward. Through disaster, the Île à Vache 
endeavor put an end to one of the more controversial 
legacies of Abraham Lincoln, ultimately forcing him to 
embrace a multiracial future. 
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The decision to send freed men, women, and 
children to Île à Vache was not the brainchild of Lincoln, 
rather it was the tangible completion of decades of 
colonization rhetoric and action throughout the United 
States. Colonization, the state-sponsored emigration and 
resettlement of freed slaves outside of the United States, 
possessed a deep legacy in the early United States.
56
 
Thomas Jefferson, in his 1785 Notes on the State of 
Virginia, documented his concerns over the justice of 
forced bondage as well as ―new provocations‖ of slavery 
that could arise in the future, and later took an interest in 
political proposals of colonization.
57
 The political 
legitimization of colonization began in 1816, when 
Virginia Delegate Charles Fenton Mercer and New Jersey 
Reverend Robert Finley established the American 
Colonization Society (ACS), emerging as the preeminent 
colonization organization.
58
 Even Henry Clay, Lincoln‘s 
―beau ideal of a statesman‖ and Whig forbearer took an 
active interest in the ACS alongside other early national 
luminaries John Marshall, Francis Scott Key, and James 
Madison.
59
 By its own estimates, the ACS had aided in the 
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emigration of 11,909 African Americans from the date of 
its founding through 1867, though only a negligible 
amount occurred following the outbreak of war.
60
 
Furthermore, local colonization groups emerged across 
the United States from Providence to Augusta, frequently 
pressing state governments for funding of prospective 
journeys.
61
 Colonization was hardly a passing political 
fancy, but rather was an ingrained belief in the minds of 
many of the young nation‘s leaders. However, it also 
remained to be seen whether such proposals could ever 
succeed in reality on a larger scale and with governmental 
assistance, a question that would be answered with the 
failure of Île à Vache. 
Support for colonization was widespread 
throughout the antebellum United States, albeit for 
divergent motivations. In the North, colonization 
sentiment arose from a similar religious vein as 
abolitionism, specifically a post-Great Awakening 
missionary impulse to both remove bondage at home and 
to project the Gospel abroad.
62
 There were also calls for 
colonization strictly as a means to control a rising labor 
force of freedmen, as evidenced by the Tammany Hall 
Young Men‘s Democratic Club‘s resolution in March 
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1862: ―we are opposed to emancipating negro slaves, 
unless on some plan of colonization, that they may not 
come into contact with the white man‘s labor.‖63 Southern 
colonizationists, including those who saw no moral 
objection to slavery, argued that exclusion of free blacks, 
coupled with gradual emancipation, would be beneficial 
for white planters in the future and reduce the threat of 
black retribution.
64
 Both attitudes were shaped by a 
pseudoscientific notion of race that emerged in the 1830s 
and continued to the age of Lincoln, centered on the 
supposed infeasibility of a multi-racial state.
65
 It was 
evident that mixed motivations were at the heart of 
colonization, and would further demonstrate the 
difficulties of implementing effective policy. 
As colonization movements gained credence in 
national and state discourse, one powerful political 
advocate emerged in Washington from Springfield, 
Illinois, in the form of Abraham Lincoln. Leaders in 
colonization circles recognized his personal devotion to 
the movement, as in 1853 and 1855 Lincoln addressed 
the annual meeting of the Illinois Conservation Society.
66
 
Lincoln‘s support of colonization, as evidenced through a 
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lifetime of speeches, came from a sincere and profound 
desire to improve the condition of African Americans, 
even in this misguided venture. This sentiment of 
benevolence is evident in Lincoln‘s 1852 eulogy for 
Henry Clay, in which the future President speaks of a 
longing for justice ―in restoring a captive people to their 
long-lost father-land, with bright prospects for the future; 
and this too, so gradually, that neither races nor 
individuals shall have suffered by the change.‖67 Later 
speeches reflected this pattern for Lincoln, as he 
expressed the same missionary impulse that guided early 
colonization advocates in one 1857 speech in which he 
invoked Christian duty to the policy, comparing African 
Americans to enslaved Israelites.
68
 This rhetoric also 
emphatically disproves a prevalent historical narrative 
surrounding Lincoln and colonization espoused by James 
Oakes, in which he described colonization rhetoric as 
solely political grandstanding and pandering to ―make 
emancipation more palatable to white racists.‖69 Lincoln‘s 
words and actions throughout his public life establish his 
sincere dedication to the cause of colonization, which 
would ultimately conclude with the failed experiment at 
Île à Vache. 
Lincoln‘s decision to approve the Île à Vache 
venture stemmed from a combination of logistical and 
diplomatic convenience that had proven impossible in 
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other possible locations. Upon his inauguration, Lincoln 
explored possible venues for colonization, including 
directing his Minister to Guatemala with gauging interest 
in colonization projects throughout the Americas.
70
 By 
1862, the administration had narrowed possible locations 
for emigration into the Western Hemisphere. While the 
West African nation of Liberia had been a location of 
interest since its founding by the American Colonization 
Society in 1822, attempts at state building quickly failed, 
and left the nation in the midst of disease and a harsh 
diplomatic climate.
71
 Lincoln himself lamented this reality, 
stating, ―If they were all landed there in a day, they would 
all perish in the next ten days,‖ but his acceptance of the 
infeasibility of transatlantic colonization further 
demonstrates his practical nature in the matter of black 
emigration.
72
 
After eliminating Liberia as a feasible option, 
Lincoln explored the possibilities of emigration to Central 
and South America, a policy that entailed new diplomatic 
challenges. Much of this diplomatic responsibility fell on 
the shoulders of Secretary of State William Seward, a 
staunch advocate of assimilation, who publicly declared, 
―I am always for bringing men and states into the Union, 
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never for taking any out.‖73 Lincoln acknowledged these 
difficulties before, stating, ―The political affairs in Central 
America are not in quite as satisfactory condition as I 
wish.‖74 The administration, per the advice of the Sen. 
Samuel Pomeroy and Rev. James Mitchell, Lincoln‘s 
Commissioner of Emigration and Colonization, found the 
most favorable scenario in the province of Chiriqui, in 
present day Panama.
75
 Lincoln had initially authorized the 
mission under the auspices of ―coal and privileges,‖ but 
that promise proved unfounded when Joseph Henry of 
the Smithsonian Institute found Chiriqui coal to not only 
be poor for steam engines, but dangerously flammable.
76
 
In addition, background checks revealed that the private 
speculator behind the Chiriqui venture had been 
suspected of embezzlement, prompting a swift 
reconsideration of this specific plan.
77
 By September 
1862, the Central American plan was dead, leaving one 
remaining option to fulfill Lincoln‘s dream of 
colonization in Île à Vache. 
As Lincoln explored emigration opportunities in 
Central America and the Caribbean, he drew the ire of 
abolitionist groups both black and white. National 
abolition figures had been wary of Lincoln‘s proposals to 
prevent the spread of slavery and gradual emancipation 
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since his arrival on the national stage.
78
 On colonization, 
however, these disagreements reached a fever pitch, such 
as William Lloyd Garrison‘s public denouncement of 
―puerile, absurd, illogical, impertinent, and untimely‖ 
schemes in his periodical The Liberator, placing 
responsibility on the President who endorsed them.
79
 
These disagreements accompanied colonization during 
his presidency, but became most raucous upon his 
meeting with the Deputation of Negroes in 1862.  
The antipathy between Lincoln and abolitionists 
on the issue of colonization reached its apogee on August 
14, 1862, when a committee of five African American 
leaders met with Lincoln at the White House. These men 
might not have been the best audience to colonization 
proposals, as three were members of a black abolitionist 
group that had recently been responsible for the 
banishment of emigration lobbyists from Washington.
80
 
Lincoln outlined his colonization proposals, but his 
rationale, particularly the statement ―you and we are 
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different races. We have between us a broader difference 
than exists between almost any other two races,‖ met a 
harsh rebuke.
81
 The outcry to this meeting in the black 
community was widespread, evidenced by Frederick 
Douglass‘ characterization of Lincoln as a ―genuine 
representative of American prejudice and Negro hatred.‖ 
in the September 1862 issue of Douglass‘ Monthly.82 
Ultimately this experience demonstrated a key problem 
for Lincoln regarding colonization, specifically that the 
President, who had limited experience with African 
Americans in his personal life, had drastically misgauged 
black resistance, which was nearly universal.
83
  
The negation of transatlantic and Central 
American colonization schemes, while disheartening to 
Mitchell and other advocates, also opened the 
opportunity for the venture to Île à Vache. The proposal 
did not emerge from within the administration, but rather 
came per the solicitation of Bernard Kock, an American 
speculator who had obtained an agreement with the 
Haitian government for ten-year privileges for timber on 
Île à Vache, a hilly island off of the coast of Haiti roughly 
25 square miles in size.
84
 Kock found entry into the White 
House through frequent correspondence with Mitchell, 
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supplementing his own legitimacy by appending his 
correspondence with the title ―Governor of A Vache.‖85 
Mitchell was aware of Haiti as a possible locale for 
colonization, as the abolitionist and Republican activist 
James Redpath had funded a campaign to export 
freedmen to the main island from 1860-62; this project, 
however, quickly foundered, as Redpath encountered 
both Haitian opposition and financial difficulties that 
forced his retreat.
86
 Nonetheless, the prospects of a 
federally-funded colonization venture proved enticing for 
Mitchell, who agreed on the terms of a contract with 
Kock on November 6, 1862: 5,000 free blacks would 
depart to Île à Vache at the rate of $50 per person in 
transfer costs, with Kock also responsible for the 
construction of sufficient living quarters, medical facilities, 
and the distribution of fair wages.
87
 The contract also 
included $600,000 in funds authorized by Congress for 
the purposes of colonization, no insignificant amount at a 
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time when the overall federal budget was slightly greater 
than $60 million and the nation was at the peak of the 
Civil War, costly in both dollars and lives.
88
 On Île à 
Vache, the Lincoln administration had found an ideal 
location for a federally funded colony, and December 1, 
1862, only a month before the signing of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln had agreed to terms 
with Kock, and the first government-run colonization was 
afoot.
89
 
The Île à Vache proposal also succeeded in 
satisfying the one unwavering aspect of Lincoln‘s 
colonization policy, specifically that it remain voluntary. 
During one Cabinet debate over colonization proposals, 
in reaction to a suggestion of compulsory deportation, 
Lincoln emphasized, ―Their emigration must be 
voluntary and without expense to themselves.‖90 This 
unwavering belief in colonization as strictly a voluntary 
measure further demonstrates Lincoln‘s earnest 
conviction that blacks would be inclined to pursue 
emigration. On paper, Île à Vache was the ideal 
opportunity to do just that.  
The first inauspicious signs of the Île à Vache 
venture emerged nearly immediately after the 
administration approved the contract with Kock. After 
Lincoln approved Secretary Seward‘s request for a 
temporary investigation into Kock on January 8, 1863, 
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one month after the signing of the initial contract, word 
began to trickle into Washington concerning the 
―Governor.‖91 Statements from New Orleans depicted a 
man who had used deceptive business practices to unload 
shipments of low-quality tobacco on unsuspecting 
merchants, while the United States Commissioner in 
Haiti spoke of Kock as an unpopular figure in Port-au-
Prince and just as forebodingly, had not yet heard of any 
progress in constructing a settlement on the island.
92
 
These allegations overwhelmed to both the Interior 
Department and the President, and on April 16, 1863, 
Lincoln formally rescinded Kock‘s contract.93 Shortly 
beforehand, on March 20, Lincoln agreed to terms with 
more reputable characters, Wall Street financiers Paul S. 
Forbes and Charles K. Tuckerman, for a rate of $50 per 
colonist at a maximum of 500 colonists.
94
 Unfortunately 
for the expectant colonists, this transfer would not spell 
the end for Bernard Kock in Haiti, as ultimately his 
actions at the helm of the failed colonization project 
would validate Attorney General Edward Bates‘ claim that 
he was but ―an errant humbug.‖95  
As for the black settlers themselves, sources and 
documentary evidence of their lives both before and after 
Île à Vache are regrettably limited. Records from Fort 
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Monroe, however, reveal that they were ―principally 
Virginia Negroes from the Tidewater area around 
Norfolk, Petersburg, and Richmond,‖ and by status as 
contrabands, represented an ideal group for the 
experiment of emancipation and subsequent 
colonization.
96
 The chosen colonists for the project 
represented a unique subsection of newly freed blacks; 
aside from a few family units, the settlers were individuals 
divided relatively evenly by gender.
97
 Their enthusiastic 
reaction to the prospect of colonization provided hope 
for future projects, as accounts describe those chosen to 
have exalted cries of ―Amen‖ and ―Hallelujah‖ in 
anticipation of a future of landowning and true freedom.
98
 
Desire to depart former Confederate territory was a 
common sentiment for freed slaves under federal 
jurisdiction, as conditions for these ―contrabands‖ were 
rife with disease and malnutrition.
99
 These aspirations for 
improvement would tragically not come to fruition on Île 
à Vache, and ultimately their experience defined the 
human element of the disaster.  
From the moment the vessel Ocean Ranger 
departed Fortress Monroe on April 14, 1863 carrying 453 
black settlers, the mission to colonize Île à Vache was an 
unmitigated failure.
100
 The journey itself demonstrated the 
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inherent dangers of mass ocean transport, as a major bout 
of smallpox killed at least twenty-five settlers at sea, while 
the survivors were allegedly forced to pay for their own 
water rations.
101
 The real horrors began, however, once 
the settlers arrived on the island, as Kock instituted a 
policy of ―no work: no rations‖ that rivaled any 
antebellum plantation.
102
 The contractors had reneged on 
their duty to construct any serviceable accommodations to 
protect them from the ravages of exposure, and the 
emigrants were left to construct crude huts for any shelter. 
Meanwhile, disease raged across the island from an 
outbreak of fever, killing a number of freed men and 
women.
103
 In addition to their physical maladies, colonists 
suffered psychologically from what physician and Île à 
Vache witness Dr. James Brazier deemed  ―homesickness 
[and] depression of the spirit‖ in an interview with the 
Freedmen‘s Inquiry Commission in December 1863.104 
Concurrently, attempts at cultivation proved unfruitful 
and starvation soon coupled with disease on the island, 
forcing the survivors to subsist on the decaying remains of 
corn and salt pork from the journey.
105
 The situation on 
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Île à Vache was nothing short of nightmarish, 
unbeknownst to its promoters at home. 
Washington remained ignorant of these 
developments, aside from a June 1, 1863 report from 
George C. Ross, American Vice-Consul at Aux Cayes, 
Haiti, confirming that operations were ―flourishing under 
the able, wise and humane director of its projector, 
Bernard Kock.‖106 Evidently Forbes and Tuckerman, 
ignorant on the logistics of colonization, had appointed 
Kock to coordinate their operation on the ground.
107
 By 
July 1863, the emigrants had reached a breaking point of 
mutiny, and the terrified ―Governor‖ fled the island for 
his life, while the Haitian government dispatched a 
military unit to maintain order.
108
 Within weeks, word of 
these atrocities reached American soil through Southern 
press outlets, and the nation and its leaders would learn 
the harsh realities of colonization, but not before rescuing 
the destitute colonists.
109
  
The most significant outcome of the catastrophe 
at Île à Vache was its profound impact on Lincoln, 
                                                                                                     
105
 Ibid., 247. Boyd, ―The Île à Vache Colonization Venture, 
1862-1864,‖ 52-53. 
106
 Bancroft, 247. 
107
 Boyd, ―The Île à Vache Colonization Venture, 1862-1864,‖ 
51. 
108
 Bancroft, 246. 
Records of the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission, File 
No. 9, "Hayti and the south," Record Group 94, Letters 
Received by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series) 
1861-1870 1863-328-0, Microfilm 619, Reel 201, Frame 256, 
NARA. 
109
 Ibid., 244. 
60 
 
specifically his decision to not only rectify the situation as 
quickly as possible, but also never engage in further 
ventures of colonization. In response to these atrocities, 
Lincoln acted curiously slowly to rectify the situation and 
remove the emigrants from a situation for which he was 
ultimately responsible. In mid October 1863, more than 
three months after the first media accounts of the island‘s 
conditions emerged, Lincoln ordered D.C. Donnohue, a 
former legal associate of Secretary Usher, to sail to Île à 
Vache and verify the reported conditions on the island 
while offering immediate aid to the victims.
110
 In the 
meantime, Lincoln was preparing the rescue of the 
victims of this failed operation, ordering Secretary Stanton 
on February 1, 1864 to commission a naval vessel, 
complete with supplies and medical personnel, to depart 
immediately to the island for rescue purposes.
111
 By 
March 4 1865, the U.S. Navy‘s Marcia C. Day had 
departed from Île à Vache with 350 surviving emigrants, 
reaching its ultimate destination in Alexandria, Virginia, 
per Lincoln‘s orders.112 
According to future Assistant Commission of the 
Freedmen‘s Bureau John Eaton, Lincoln expressed grave 
distress over the failure on Île à Vache, and was left 
shaken by the experience.
113
  The timing of the incident 
was unfortunate for all sides, as reports of Kock‘s Haitian 
fiefdom emerged just as the dust was settling at Gettysburg 
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and the War continued in full throughout the summer. 
Nonetheless, it remains significant that Lincoln, once fully 
aware of the atrocities committed under his watch, 
ultimately acted to set the situation right and return the 
emigrants to their nation of birth. 
In the aftermath of Île à Vache, its primary actors 
were quick to pronounce blame for the disaster in nearly 
all aspects of the operation. Forbes and Tuckerman were 
quick to denounce the actions of the man they appointed 
to run the colony, blaming the ―obnoxious‖ Kock for 
dereliction of duty and breach of contract in one public 
statement.
114
 In addition to the rampant acts of 
exploitation on the island, federally-promised support 
proved to be an illusion to both the emigrants and their 
benefactors; of the $600,000 allocated for colonization 
efforts, only $38,329.93 was ever spent on Île à Vache, a 
majority of which went straight to the salaries of Rev. 
James Mitchell, expenses such as the transportation costs 
for the project, and compensation to Sen. Samuel 
Pomeroy for his legislative assistance in the project.
115
 
Forbes and Tuckerman were unable to recoup their 
investment that ended up totaling over $90,000 despite 
their protestations, which included the publishing of a 
self-exonerating pamphlet that deflected the majority of 
the blame onto the Interior Department and Kock.
116
 
Usher‘s Interior Department, ―eager to forget a fiasco that 
was held up to ridicule by the increasingly powerful 
Radical branch of the Republican Party,‖ was reluctant to 
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request funds at the risk of spectacle, and Forbes and 
Tuckerman‘s appeal ultimately went unheeded.117 
Curiously enough, Kock attempted to return to the island 
where he had caused so much havoc on Christmas Day 
1863, only to flee in terror on the first boat out when he 
learned of threats to his life at the hands of those he had 
exploited.
118
 Ultimately, the responsibility for this 
humanitarian disaster lay at the feet of the Chief 
Executive, and his reaction proved monumental in the 
end of colonization as a chimera in American policy. 
Following his reversal of the Île à Vache venture, 
Lincoln not only remained silent on the failed Haitian 
colony, but also never issued another public statement 
concerning colonization, a decision that is astounding 
after his many prior proclamations on the matter.
119
 His 
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abandonment of colonization as a viable policy option 
was evident in his acceptance of Minnesota Senator 
Morton S. Wikinson‘s bill introduced on March 15, 
1864, which formally withdrew any federal funds for 
future colonization. Upon its passage on July 2, Lincoln 
signed the bill, and the colonization in the United States 
was effectively dead, with nary a word from the 
President.
120
 Colonization was officially an afterthought in 
Congressional policy as a direct result of Île à Vache, but 
it was Lincoln‘s rejection that would prove to be the nail 
in the moribund movement‘s coffin. 
Despite his silence on the matter, Lincoln‘s 
abandonment of colonization as a viable policy in the 
wake of Île à Vache is evident through the commentary of 
those still involved both in the administration and 
dwindling colonization efforts. On July 1, 1864, nearly 
four months since the last of the Île à Vache refugees had 
returned to Washington, Lincoln‘s personal secretary 
John Hay expressed relief when he wrote, ―I am glad the 
President has sloughed off that idea of colonization. I 
have always thought it a hideous & barbarous humbug & 
the thievery of Pomeroy and Kock have about converted 
him to the same belief.‖121 The inclusion of Pomeroy and 
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Kock in this statement further shows the specter of Haiti 
within the administration. Conversely, Pomeroy became 
increasingly frustrated with a lack of new emigration 
efforts, and wrote to Lincoln in demand of action for the 
estimated fourteen thousand freedmen who had reached 
out to Pomeroy in hopes of manning the next colony.
122
 
Emancipation was a watershed moment for ACS activists, 
and abandonment by a perceived ally in the White House 
proved fatal; the organization, which had already been 
operating under heavy costs without matching incomes, 
dwindled in popularity until it published its final 
newsletter, The African Repository, in 1892.123 Through 
making the deliberate effort to remain silent on 
colonization, but also to ignore any possibilities of future 
endeavors following Île à Vache, Lincoln showed the 
transformative impact this failure had on his evolution 
toward a dying policy. 
The abject failure of the Île à Vache venture had 
dramatic ramifications for the Lincoln administration in 
its aftermath, as preexisting rivalries and disagreements 
within the White House reached an apex. Opinions on 
colonization were split nearly evenly across Lincoln‘s 
cabinet, with Seward, Welles, and Stanton firmly against 
any such proposals, while Interior Secretaries Caleb 
Smith and John Usher, alongside Postmaster General 
Montgomery Blair were vocal in favor of colonization as a 
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policy measure.
124
 Many of these arguments centered 
Emigration Commissioner Mitchell, who frequently drew 
the ire of his superiors in the Interior Department with 
his frequent association with speculators and other less-
reputable colonization advocates.
125
 Île à Vache provided 
an ideal opportunity for an incensed Usher to freeze 
Mitchell‘s salary and have him expelled from his office.126 
These disagreements also embroiled the President 
himself, particularly regarding his Secretary of State, 
William Seward. While Seward fulfilled his duties to 
explore colonization options, he frequently voiced his 
displeasure to the President.
127
 While recovering from an 
assassination attempt within the same conspiracy that had 
killed Lincoln, Seward told an interviewer, ―Only once… 
did we disagree in sentiment… His ‗colonization‘ scheme, 
which I opposed on the self-evident principle that all 
natives of a country have an equal right in its soil.‖128 The 
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Lincoln administration provided an ideal microcosm of 
the debates over colonization, and ultimately the fiasco at 
Île à Vache brought these debates to the forefront. 
In the public arena, media coverage of the Île à 
Vache disaster proved to be overwhelmingly negative 
towards colonization as a policy option for the Lincoln 
administration and allies. Colonization efforts in the 
Caribbean in the months preceding Emancipation already 
elicited outcry from Northern media members of both 
political parties. The Democratic New York Evening 
Express railed against logistical costs that deportation 
would ―entail upon the White Labor of the North,‖ while 
the Republican New York Times offered an equally blunt 
editorial statement: ―‗No, Mr. Pomeroy. No, Mr. 
President. The enfranchised blacks must find homes, 
without circumnavigating the sea at the National 
expense.‖129 The media reaction was swift following Île à 
Vache, and following its report of the material failings of 
the operation, the Chicago Tribune issued an editorial 
with the prescient title ―The End of Colonization.‖ In it, 
the staff swiftly declared, ―We have probably seen the last 
of a long line of attempts to colonize the blacks from this 
country‖ due to infeasibility in both logistics and black 
desire, observing, ―their general reluctance to leave the 
country is a good reason why they should not.‖130 African 
American newspapers issued sentiments of relief, such as 
the New Orleans Tribune‘s declaration that ―We shall 
hear no more of that suicidal folly.
131
 These editorials, 
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coupled with factual accounts of the horrific details on the 
island, contributed to a public discourse that rejected 
colonization once and for all following Île à Vache. 
The failure of colonization as a feasible policy 
option, while temporarily disheartening to Lincoln, 
nonetheless left new opportunities for post-war racial 
policies, particularly military enlistment and participation 
in an emancipated nation. This turn to assimilation, 
rather than displacement, found support within black 
communities, particularly those who saw enlistment as an 
avenue to support the nation and president that had 
granted them freedom.
132
 African-African intellectuals had 
embraced their own permanent status, as abolitionist and 
staunch anti-colonization advocate David Walker wrote in 
his Appeal that indeed the true ―promised land‖ for 
former slaves was in the United States.
133
 Lincoln voiced 
his support of black enlistment and subsequent positions 
in the post-war society in his final public address on April 
11, 1865, when he advocated for ―the elective franchise… 
on those that serve our cause as soldiers,‖ an effort he 
argued would sustain the reunified Republic.
134
 Through 
statements such as this, the President offered optimism of 
black allegiance and democratic participation in a way that 
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would never require such ill-conceived attempts as Île à 
Vache again. In the symbolic transition from colonization 
to assimilation, a number of the surviving men of the 
colony found both shelter and income through enlistment 
in the Union army, fulfilling one black abolitionist‘s desire 
for recognition that ―this land which we have watered with 
our tears and our blood, is now our mother country.‖135 
Despite its failure on both humanitarian and 
political grounds, the Île à Vache excursion proved to 
have one positive lasting consequence for the United 
States and the legacy of Abraham Lincoln in the realm of 
diplomacy, specifically through the diplomatic recognition 
of Haiti. Following Toussaint L‘Ouverture‘s 1804 victory 
and subsequent expulsion of French colonists from the 
island state, the Jefferson administration issued a 
temporary embargo and diplomatic non-recognition of 
the sole black-controlled state in the Western 
Hemisphere; the latter policy soon became a norm for 
Jefferson‘s successors in the White House.136 This policy 
stood in stark contrast to the traditional de facto policy of 
diplomatic recognition toward former Spanish and 
French colonies in the Americas, described by the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee in 1822 when it reported to 
President James Monroe, ―it is sufficient that it is really 
sovereign and independent,‖ as grounds for recognition, a 
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qualification that undoubtedly applied in Haiti.
137
 The Île 
à Vache endeavor, however, caused a rapid shift in this 
policy, as American involvement on Haitian soil 
necessitated recognition of the state that had already 
signed a contract with Kock.
138
 On December 3, 1861, 
one year prior to his approval of the Île à Vache proposal, 
as part of his annual address to Congress, Lincoln 
recommended the recognition of both Haiti and Liberia, 
citing ―important commercial advantages might be 
secured by favorable commercial treaties with them.‖139 
Within months the United States had formally 
reestablished ties with Haiti; in response, the Republican 
press praised Lincoln, typified by the New York Times 
proclaiming victory over the era ―when the slave-lords 
ruled in our legislative halls.‖140 The diplomatic 
recognition of Haiti after decades of ambivalence and 
hostility demonstrates that for all of the individual losses 
of the Île à Vache fiasco, some good still managed to 
emerge from the island.  
The historiographical conversation surrounding 
Île à Vache is focused on one of the more confounding 
aspects of the abolitionist movement and presidency of 
Abraham Lincoln, specifically, support of colonization as 
a policy appendage of emancipation. To an observer 
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today, the concept of colonization appears at its most 
innocuous to be infeasible and at its most malicious as the 
ultimate solution for American racists.
141
 Colonization as a 
serious policy option appears outlandish from a 
contemporary perspective, and Lincoln‘s support for 
black emigration provides a contrast from the image of 
the Great Emancipator. A range of scholarly works exists 
on national and local efforts to spur African American 
colonization up until the Civil War, as well, 
demonstrating the persistence of this movement in the 
antebellum years.
142
 Nonetheless, writings concerning 
Lincoln and colonization focus primarily on his 
ideological support for the movement, rather than his 
tangible efforts to enact such a policy. Therein lies Île à 
Vache; the Haitian island provided an ideal 
experimentation for these grand schemes, all to collapse 
in a spectacular fashion. For the majority of writings, even 
those specific to the endeavor, Île à Vache is but one 
example of colonization as a failed policy, rather than as a 
pivotal moment in Lincoln‘s strategy toward a post-
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Emancipation and biracial United States.
143
 Ultimately the 
historical record, as proven in this essay through a 
combination of policy shifts and lack of official statements 
following the disaster are more reliable than speculation, 
demonstrating that the Haitian excursion was the death 
knell for colonization.  
An evaluation of the historical narratives of 
colonization reveals one of the most contentious aspects 
of Lincoln scholarship, specifically his beliefs regarding 
race. Some historians have viewed Lincoln‘s support for 
colonization as an indelible blemish on his legacy, 
characterized by Eric Foner‘s description of these 
programs as ―the ethnic cleansing of America‖ in one 
review.
144
 Both this interpretation, as well as a newfound 
interest in colonization as anything but a footnote in 
history, emerged in the 1960s with a newfound 
historiographical interest in race.
145
 Some of these more 
vociferous analyses assert that ―to his dying day‖ Lincoln 
questioned the ability of blacks and whites to coexist in a 
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post-Emancipation United States.
146
 Nonetheless, these 
accounts provide a view of the President that frequently 
do not place colonization within its proper historical 
context, despite its obvious faults in both morality and 
pragmatism, as well as rejection within the black 
community. The accounts of abolitionists wary of Lincoln 
furthered the historiographical debate over Lincoln and 
race, a persistent and inflammatory element of his 
legacy.
147
 It is evident that an examination of the tragedy at 
Île à Vache contributes to a controversial but relevant 
appraisal of Lincoln‘s presidency, and thus must it be 
interpreted in both its failure as an endeavor as well as a 
driver of future policy. 
When the Marcia Gay departed the shores of Île 
à Vache on March 4, 1864, it left behind not only the 
ruins of one failed experiment at black resettlement, but 
also the fate of a movement itself.  The Île à Vache fiasco 
was a combination of governmental mismanagement, 
individual malfeasance, and misplaced policy ambitions, 
together culminating in death and disease for a chosen 
collection of society‘s most marginalized residents. 
Ultimately the responsibility for these failures fell on the 
shoulders of Abraham Lincoln, who made the concerted 
effort to not only rescue the surviving members of the 
expedition for return to American shores, but to forever 
abandon future schemes of black resettlement. In the 
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place of colonization, Lincoln instead explored ways to 
integrate those he had freed into a post-emancipation 
society, shaping future efforts to reunite the United States. 
Alexis de Tocqueville once wrote, ―The great privilege 
enjoyed by Americans is not to be more enlightened than 
other nations but also to have the chance to make 
mistakes that can be retrieved.‖148 The incident on Île à 
Vache, while undeniably a tragic and preventable event, 
proved a retrievable mistake through the negation of an 
unfeasible and unpopular solution to racial questions, 
replaced by subsequent transformation toward a more 
integrated future. 
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Book Review: The Fall of the House of Dixie, by Bruce 
Levine  
Brexton O'Donnel 
     Bruce Levine's The Fall of the House of Dixie (2013) 
opens with a stirring reminder of the size and wealth of 
the antebellum Southern states, and the fact that much of 
that wealth was in human capital. Levine extensively 
details the immense wealth tied up in slavery, and the 
luxurious lifestyle of the Southern slave-holding elite. The 
book‘s goal is to stress the importance of slavery as an 
economic and social institution for white Southerners, 
and a central fact of life for them. Levine argues that the 
Civil War transformed from a conventional military 
conflict into a revolutionary struggle that transformed 
American society and politics. His core thesis is that the 
Civil War brought about a great social and political 
revolution in the American South especially. Most of the 
book consists of Levine seeking to demonstrate how the 
structures of wealth and power in the South, founded on 
the cornerstone of slavery, were radically altered by the 
Civil War in an event he calls ―the second American 
revolution.‖149 
 Levine begins the book by laying out the 
background of ―The House of Dixie‖ and continues 
chronologically recounting its fall through the war and 
into Reconstruction. He devotes successive chapters to 
the early phases of the war, the evolution of Federal war 
policy towards slaves and slaveholders, and the 
progressive collapse of Southern society.  Levine takes a 
dual approach in making his argument. Calling on an 
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impressive array of sources, Levine spends much of the 
book examining the relationship of slavery to the society 
and economy of the Confederacy. Dissent in the 
Confederacy, which resulted in the creation of West 
Virginia and guerrilla warfare in Unionist East Tennessee, 
comes in for close scrutiny.   
 Some of these poor whites took up arms against 
the Confederacy out of resentment at their wealthier 
neighbors leading them into war.  However, Levine also 
notes that even many poor whites continued to support 
the Confederacy.  
Still, conflict between poor whites and the Confederacy 
demonstrated the weakening of the socio-economic 
foundations that the House of Dixie stood on. 
Throughout the book, particular attention is paid to the 
amount of slaves that abandoned the Confederacy in the 
wake of the Federal armies' advance.        
     The military successes of the Federal armies 
continuously weakened the institution of slavery in the 
Confederacy,  and as the fortunes of slavery waned, so did 
the enthusiasm of  Confederates for the war. Levine does 
not forget to look at the situation through the eyes of the 
slaves either. Where the collapse of the South brought 
ruin to slaveholders, it uplifted the newly freed black 
population of the South and greatly altered their position 
in Southern society, as they could no longer be sold or 
forcibly separated from their families.   
 A recurring theme throughout Levine's chapters 
in the latter half of the book is the increasing Confederate 
fear of what the impending end of slavery will mean, and 
their failed efforts to control their slaves. Levine's rigorous 
examination of the increasing amount of cracks in the 
social cohesion of the Confederacy throughout the book 
is its greatest strength.  
84 
 
        Levine also examines the political relationship of 
slavery to the war, particularly in the context of Federal 
war aims. Levine demonstrates how the aims of Lincoln 
and the Republican Party in regards to slavery changed 
over the course of the war. Levine rightly emphasizes that 
the Republican Party was not a revolutionary party. While 
the Republican Party was committed to undermining 
slavery, they preferred gradual change. In the early days 
of the war, only the most radical Republicans foresaw the 
end of slavery in the near future. Originally, the party 
embraced a limited war for the Union. The logic of 
events forced the Republicans to embrace a more radical 
policy, targeting slavery to win the war.
150
 
      Levine successfully crafts a provocative social history 
of the American Civil War that neatly describes the 
origins of the Southern rebellion and the social changes 
that ultimately transformed the South and brought about 
the end of the House of Dixie. The dual nature of the 
book serves it well, as Levine illustrates the social changes 
and tensions that unraveled the Confederacy's socio-
economic structure, while providing a clear political 
backdrop that contextualizes the transformation of the 
South with Northern war aims. Much of the book's 
political content is not groundbreaking, and in the hands 
of another author, might come off as tedious. But Levine 
successfully crafts a compelling narrative that skillfully 
incorporates a wide range of sources. 
 Levine also addresses the aftermath of the Civil 
War, pointing out that as the blood-toll of the Civil War 
mounted, Southerners were reluctantly reconciled to 
rejoining the Union. They did so while maintaining hopes 
of being able to restore some form of their social system, 
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and in this, they eventually succeeded.
151
 A thorny issue 
for a scholar arguing that the Civil War represented a 
social revolution that transformed the South is that the 
post-Reconstruction South managed to recreate many 
elements of the antebellum Southern society and retain 
political power. Yet Levine argues persuasively that the 
setbacks do not detract from what the ―second American 
revolution‖ did accomplish, which was to end slavery 
forever and advance the greater cause of liberty. Bruce 
Levine has penned a superb work that will stand as one of 
the premier social histories of the American Civil War. 
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―The Southern Heart Still Throbs‖:  
Caroline E. Janney and Partisan Memory‘s Grip on the 
Post-Civil War Nation  
Heather Clancy 
 
 ―Memory is not a passive act,‖ writes Caroline E. 
Janney in the prologue of her 2013 book Remembering 
the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation. 
Rather, it is a deliberate process. Our nation‘s history has 
been shaped by countless hands in innumerable ways, 
and the story of our civil war is no exception. In 
Remembering the Civil War, Janney seeks to turn our 
eyes once again onto the players, large and small, who 
shaped what came to be the accepted narrative of the 
conflict, from its inception through the 1930s and even 
bleeding through the Civil Rights Era and into the 
present. By examining the Civil War generation and its 
children, Janney sheds light on the evolution of an often 
vitriolic and always contested Civil War memory, one 
jaggedly split between reunion and reconciliation, 
progress and precedent, image and truth. Janney‘s 
postwar South is not only un-Reconstructed, but un-
Reconciled. The world of postwar memory construction 
that Janney paints for the reader is not David Blight‘s 
largely uncomplicated portrait of a willful reconciliation 
found through a common (white) racial identity. Instead, 
she offers a messy but intriguing alternative: the clasping 
of hands across the bloody chasm, but accompanied by 
clenched teeth and bitter resentment. 
 At the crux of her evaluation is her differentiation 
between ―reunion‖ and ―reconciliation.‖ The former was 
easily accepted by Confederate veterans, explains Janney, 
for although it was the bitter result of a military surrender, 
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it was not automatically emasculating or subjugating. 
Reconciliation, though, implied an alarmingly personal 
and yet simultaneously collective surrender, not only of 
armies, but also of spirit, bravery, and cause. The fight 
between Union and Confederate veterans as well as their 
descendants for control over the Civil War narrative, 
then, was in reality for legitimacy. 
 Janney treats gender, race, region, and generation 
with care, assessing not only each category but also the 
interplay between them. Janney is also careful to 
distinguish between civilian and military wartime and 
postwar experiences and the roles that both groups played 
in shaping Civil War memory. Her discussion of 
feminized memory—the part that women, and particularly 
white Southern women, played in this process is skillful. 
Her argument that women saw in popular Civil War 
memory a chance for pseudo-political engagement and 
even agency is intriguing, as is her theory that veterans of 
both sides in the decades following the war merely wore a 
façade of reconciliation and allowed their politically non-
threatening wives, sisters, and daughters to fight the battles 
for memory supremacy in their place.  
 Janney‘s analysis of the cyclical nature of Civil 
War memory is both clear and generally concise. Her 
argument falters noticeably only once, in her epilogue. 
Here she comments on the denial by ―most Americans 
[and] especially whites‖ of the central role that slavery 
played in the coming of the war. She does this despite 
having reassured the reader repeatedly throughout the 
book that northerners have never once been fully taken in 
by the sickly sweet charm of the ex-Confederacy‘s Lost 
Cause. But if a majority of Americans accept the Lost 
Cause view of slavery as unrelated to the causes of the 
Civil War, then how can a Lost Cause interpretation of 
the war have ―become increasingly marginalized‖? This 
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one notable self-contradiction is Janney‘s sole faltering 
worthy of mention; nowhere else in the book does such a 
confusion of argument arise. 
 Remembering the Civil War paces the ground 
between history and mythos in a briar patch of passed 
down lore, seeking out kernels of truth. Ultimately, 
Janney comes to few definitive conclusions by her 
epilogue, but it is well that she does not. Just as ―no single 
vision of the war could encompass the range of meanings 
and understandings such a vast American public found in 
the conflict,‖ so too do we find ourselves adrift in a sea of 
contradictory historical narratives today. Although it can 
be tempting to view our Civil War past as just that, 
Janney‘s murkier look at the postbellum period leaves 
Sesquicentennial-era historians and historiophiles to 
wonder just how reconciled our divided past truly is. The 
bloody shirt may no longer be damp with the blood of 
our fellow citizens, but it would seem that the stains are 
still visible. 
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  D. Scott Hartwig, Supervisory Historian for 
Gettysburg National Military Park, retired in the fall 
of 2013. In recognition of his long service to the park 
and community of Gettysburg, Associate Editor 
Thomas Nank interviewed Mr. Hartwig concerning 
his personal experiences gained over three decades 
working at Gettysburg as well as the future of the 
National Park Service and the field of public history 
in general.  
 
 
How does a Park Ranger successfully communicate 
events of 150 years ago to today‘s college generation? 
 
I‘d say you do it the same way we‘ve always done it, 
by making it relevant.  If you don‘t establish 
relevancy, the events of 150 years ago ultimately are 
meaningless.  We did student these education 
programs that were curriculum based, and one of the 
programs was Pickett‘s Charge.  The students were 
placed in the role of one of Pickett‘s regiments, they 
learned something about the men, they learned what 
brought the war on, and what might motivate the 
men.  They were given identities of the men, so they 
learned different things about the occupations of the 
men.  During the program, you walk the students 
across the field, so they get the idea that a lot of guys 
didn‘t make it, some were killed or wounded or 
ended up missing in action.  It was a group of juniors 
from a private school in Washington DC.  They 
were black and white, and they were all guys from an 
all-boys school, and they were pretty wild.  I knew 
enough that when you‘re dealing with students like 
that, that being a disciplinarian is never going to 
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works, so you have to build respect with them.  So 
they were having fun, goofing around, and we got 
halfway across the field, and I stopped all of them.  I 
said ―Look, guys, quiet down for just a minute.  
We‘re walking across this field, like 13,000 
Confederate soldiers did over 100 and some years 
ago, you‘re never going to have to do this, right?  
Doesn‘t mean anything to you, you‘re never going to 
have to do it.  People don‘t do this, line up and 
march across a field, face bullets and shells, right?‖  
Now at this point their curiosity was peaked: where‘s 
he going with this thing?  So I said ―There‘s never 
going to be a cop, that gets called for a domestic 
dispute, and there‘s somebody behind that door 
who‘s armed, and you have to go through it. There‘s 
never going to be a fire, where somebody‘s trapped 
inside that house, and somebody‘s got to have the 
balls to go up that ladder and get that person out.  
Never going to happen, right?  The point is, what 
these men did, people have to do every day.  They 
have to face the challenge that this might be the last 
day on earth for that guy, they have to face their 
fears, they‘ve got to go through that veritable wall of 
bullets and shell fragments, and at the same time you 
know, we may be in another war again, you never 
know what‘s coming down the pike.  You‘re not 
going to have to make Pickett‘s Charge again, but 
you are going to face things in your life, that these 
men had to face, and find the courage to conquer it.  
That‘s what you can learn today‖.  And from that 
point on, those kids listened to every single thing I 
said.  And I knew a lot of them at the end of the 
program, were really thinking about it.  Until I 
attempted to do something to make it relevant, they 
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were like, what does this mean to me, why should I 
care about this?  Up to that point, they didn‘t care.  
But the same thing is true college students or adults, 
if you‘re not making it relevant for them, why does it 
matter, why should I care?  So I come here to 
Gettysburg, there‘s a bunch of monuments, some 
guys did this or that, why should I care, why does it 
matter?  So you have to establish some type of 
relevancy. 
 
How do you inspire today‘s high school and college 
students to pursue the study of history? 
 
I‘d say you inspire them to study history by bringing 
history alive, and encouraging people to pursue 
things that interest them in history.  A lot of times, 
people have a tendency to say there‘s only a certain 
way you can learn history.  You study it, you write it, 
and that‘s the appropriate way.  Some people go out 
and do living history, why do people do that?  
People experience history in different ways.  That 
person who likes to get dressed up a portray a Civil 
War soldier, that may be their conduit for learning a 
lot more about the Civil War.  When the movie 
―Gettysburg‖ came out, a lot of people at the park, 
Rangers and guides, they were really down on it, as a 
movie in some parts its absolutely ridiculous.  But 
the thing about the movie is that it really reached a 
huge number of people, and it was a great place to 
start from with visitors.  Okay, so you‘ve seen the 
movie, you remember such-and-such that happened 
in the movie, now let‘s talk about what really 
happened.  People are always interested in that.  You 
can get people charged up about history when you 
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start talking about people in history, rather than units 
and tactics and strategy and statistics and those sorts 
of things, they can be really interesting.  But to the 
average person, it‘s generally people that draw you in 
and really get you going.  How many people have 
had a ―love affair‖ with Joshua Chamberlain, and 
then suddenly started reading and finding out about 
these other things?   
 
As a historian, how has working for the NPS affected 
the way in which you approach history? 
 
Well for one thing, as an NPS historian, you‘re a 
public historian, and when you‘re doing 
interpretation for the public, they can just get up and 
walk away, they‘re not paying to listen to you, its free.  
You have to be skilled in how you present 
controversial material.  So you‘re in the National 
Cemetery and you want to talk about what the war 
was about, and you‘ve got some people on that 
program who are neo-Confederates.  They don‘t 
think it had anything to do with slavery.  Now how 
do you keep those people on the program?   You 
have to make them think, because if you verbally 
punch them between the eyes, they‘re leaving 
because they don‘t want to hear to what you have to 
say.  So as an NPS historian, you learn the fine art of 
finessing how you tell people things.  As another 
example: once I was giving a Pickett‘s Charge walk 
for adults, it was a two-hour walk.  The program 
focused on the attack, its main purpose was to talk 
about why did Lee make the attack, why did the 
attack fail, and what were the consequences of it.  
When we got half-way across the field, I stopped 
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everybody and I said ―Ok, let‘s talk about why these 
men are coming across this field, trying to kill those 
men, who are waiting for them, and are going to deal 
death to them.  Why are they doing it?  Let‘s talk 
about the individual, why is he doing it?  There are a 
multitude of reasons.  They may like the uniform, 
they got coerced into doing it, their girlfriend wanted 
them to do it, they believe in what they‘re fighting 
for, there‘s all sorts of reasons they‘re going in.  But 
what is their government fighting for?  If you‘re a 
Confederate soldier, you‘re fighting to set up a slave 
holding republic.  That‘s what you‘re fighting for.  If 
you‘re a federal soldier, you‘re fighting to preserve 
the Union, and by this point in the war to destroy 
slavery.  Doesn‘t matter whether you care or don‘t 
care about those things, thats what you‘re fighting for.  
Now let‘s move on to the attack…‖  So all you want 
to do is make people think.  You don‘t want to hit 
them over the head with stuff, because that‘s the 
quickest way to turn them off.  All I ever wanted to 
do in those situations is put a little something in there 
that got the wheels turning, and maybe cause them to 
question some of the things that they thought.   
  
What part of your training or education was the most 
fundamental to your job? Why was it so meaningful 
and how did it shape your work? 
  
I don‘t want to be uncharitable to the Park Service, 
but it does not have a training program to prepare 
somebody to work in a Civil War park.  In the early 
years, they did do a pretty good job of training 
people to be interpreters, training people to 
interpret: what does interpretation mean, what are 
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the fundamentals of it?  They had these different 
courses all interpreters were supposed to go through.  
But I would say for myself, personally, two things in 
college that prepared me the best for working at 
Gettysburg.  One was that I took three credit courses 
from E. B. Long, the research editor for Bruce 
Catton.  The last course I took from him, was a 
course that he designed for me and one other guy, 
which was an unbelievable experience, and really 
fantastic.  I wish I could have done more with him, 
but I learned a lot from him about doing good Civil 
War history.  The second thing was we had a 
professor, at the University of Wyoming named 
Myron Sutton who was an NPS employee, and the 
NPS didn‘t know what to do with him, because he 
was towards the end of his career.  He had been 
involved in setting up some parks, like Mt. Cook in 
New Zealand, Tiger Tops in Nepal, and he was an 
amazing photographer, he and his wife.  He did 
these three screen slide presentations, and taught 
several courses that talked about the national parks, 
the NPS, and interpretation.  I learned a lot from 
him about what interpretation really was.  Other 
history courses I took were also very helpful but 
Long was really good, combined with this strong 
background in interpretation and how the Park 
Service worked before I even got to Gettysburg really 
helped me a lot.   
 
What has been the most significant change in the 
NPS since you first started? 
  
Probably the most significant change in the NPS 
since I started is doing more with less.  If the Park 
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Service was a business, its buying power has been 
severely eroded.  In 1980, they were talking about it 
then, ―we‘re going to have to do more with less.‖  
But the ―more with less‖ in 1980 and 2014 are like 
night and day.  To give you an example of how that 
works: In 1991 the Visitor Center at Gettysburg, and 
we were really impressed, got 465,000 visitors which 
was a huge number.  It gets about 1.2 million visitors 
a year now.  We have no more buying power, no 
more staff, no more anything. In fact, overall in the 
park we have less.  So think about any business that 
tripled the amount of customers that doesn‘t make 
itself any bigger, it just asks its people to do more 
stuff.  That‘s been a big issue.  The second thing I‘d 
say, and this is more specific to the Civil War parks 
and Gettysburg, is the broadening of interpretation.  
I wouldn‘t say that that‘s universal, because what 
happens at one park doesn‘t necessarily happen at 
another.  I always tell people: think of the parks as 
kind of like a Navy: they all fly the same flag, they all 
have different captains, and they all have different 
ways of doing things.  Some people don‘t like what 
this park is doing, so they do their own thing.  We all 
know about the ―Rally on the High Ground‖ and the 
broadening of interpretation, some parks gave it a 
little bit of lip service but don‘t do anything towards 
it.  And some parks have been diminished so much 
they hardly do any interpretation at all.  Gettysburg is 
lucky, we do a lot of interpretation.  Fredericksburg 
does a lot of interpretation.  Some parks just don‘t 
have the people to do it.  They‘re more traditional: 
put a Park Ranger behind a desk, he or she smiles 
and greets people and tells them where the 
restrooms are and when the film starts and maybe 
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give a little 5-minute introductory talk.  Or they have 
a guy in a uniform that talks about the Civil War 
soldier, but doesn‘t really get into motivations or any 
of that stuff.  Its very uneven but, in general, we are 
much better off than we were 30 years ago, a lot 
better off.   
 
What do you see as the NPS's greatest challenge? 
 
Getting quality people.  Its a challenge, a real 
challenge.  In the government today, particularly in 
the Park Service, the process for applying is really 
difficult, complicated and confusing.  Our personnel 
office that has to rate and rank applications when 
they come in are really overworked, those places 
took a lot of hits in personnel.  They contract out a 
lot of that stuff.  If you want to take care of the parks, 
you gotta get the best people.  You really want to 
work with the best people.  A lot of the best people 
get demoralized by the process and they get a job 
somewhere else.  Sometimes its people who simply 
can‘t get a job anywhere else, or its someone who just 
stays at it for so long they end up getting the job, but 
they‘re not the best person.  For managers, I would 
say, its continuing to find resources to continue to do 
your job, and protect, preserve and interpret your 
park.  That is going to be a really big challenge.  
We‘re lucky here at Gettysburg because we have the 
Gettysburg Foundation.  If we didn‘t have that, it 
would be Little Big Horn time, or at least we‘d be on 
the road there! [laughter]. 
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What are your thoughts about the relationship 
between GNMP, CWI and history students at 
Gettysburg College?  Are there ways you think those 
relationships could be improved? 
 
I think they‘ve been really good.  We‘ve had great 
luck with our work study students, every single 
person we‘ve had from the College has been 
fantastic.  One of them is a permanent Ranger now, 
Chris Gwinn.  What I think makes [the 
relationships] the best is when there‘s open 
communications between the Institute and whoever 
happens to be in the position as the Chief of 
Interpretation at Gettysburg, that they‘re both 
working together to find things that will benefit 
students.  At the same time, the park is making 
people aware of things that are going on at the 
Institute that will benefit people who work at the 
park, and also visitors that come to the park.  We‘ve 
had a number of people who were work study 
students or were volunteers for us or interns in the 
summertime who have been associated with the Civil 
War Institute.  In fact, I‘ll say that one of the best 
things that‘s happened between the park and the 
Institute is Pete Carmichael.  When Pete got here, 
and he is, among the academics I‘ve known over the 
years, he is unusual to me in how hard he works for 
his students, to try to give them real-world 
experiences that will make them more competitive 
for jobs.  One of the things he set up is the intern 
interview process, where all these people from 
Appomattox and Fredericksburg and Manassas and 
almost all the other parks come here to interview 
interns, and I‘ll tell you what, its a fantastic thing that 
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he did.  Previous to that, we didn‘t get a lot of interns 
from Gettysburg College, they just didn‘t apply for 
internships. 
 
What is one thing about the battle here that still 
puzzles you? 
 
There‘s a lot of things you‘d love to know the answer 
to.  Did Captain Johnson really get on to Little 
Round Top?  Just where did Captain Johnson go?  
What did Lee tell him, and what did Lee tell 
General Longstreet when Johnson was going to 
accompany Longstreet‘s march?  As I like to point 
out to people, think about this: he tells Longstreet 
that Captain Johnson will be your guide.  Johnson is 
not there.  He tells Johnson that I want you to 
accompany Longstreet‘s command.  Those are two 
entirely different things!  Particularly in the Army of 
Northern Virginia they did things like that all the 
time.  Of course you‘d love to know all the things 
that went back and forth between Sickles and 
Meade.  I think its fairly well established that Sickles, 
if orders had any meaning, did in fact have orders [to 
stay where he was].  The Confederate army, because 
they lose the battle, is actually far less well 
documented than the Union army is.  So where is 
Lee throughout much of July 2nd?  Why does Lee 
think that a reconnaissance that was performed at 
5:00 am is still viable almost 12 hours later, that 
nothing has changed?  That seems kind of unusual 
to me.  I‘d certainly love to know what Lee was 
thinking, and I have a lot of speculations, but I‘d like 
to know what was he thinking when he thought 
Pickett‘s Charge was a good idea.  What was running 
99 
 
through his head?  What was his thought process 
that caused him to arrive at that decision.   
 
If you had one career ―do-over‖, what would you do 
differently? 
 
There‘s probably a lot of things I‘d do differently! 
[laughter].  At Gettysburg it was pretty great, it was 
the ideal situation.  I had a boss [recently retired 
park Superintendent Bob Kirby] who worked to get 
you the resources you needed to get the work done, 
and gave you the freedom to be creative, and trusted 
you, put implicit trust in what you did.  And that is 
rare, really rare, to find somebody who will do that.  
We had this opportunity to do all these really cool 
things at the park.  Maybe I would have done some 
of them earlier, I don‘t know.  I honestly can‘t think 
of anything at this point that I would say I‘m 
definitely going to do that differently. 
 
What are you most proud of accomplishing in your 
career? 
 
Several things, one would be the museum.  That was 
a huge amount of work and I think that it came out 
fantastically.  I think the building works really, really 
well.  The interpretive program we developed I think 
is outstanding.  It really reaches a lot of different 
aspects of the war, there‘s a lot of variety to it.  
Economically, I have no doubt at all, it has benefited 
this community a great deal because there‘s a reason 
to come here to the park.  There are these public 
programs you can go on.  Think about the 
anniversary battle walks that we did, when you have 
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400-500 people show up: they all have to go eat 
somewhere.  They stay at hotels.  Now imagine we 
don‘t do that.  Imagine we never started it, never did 
it and nobody shows up.  Those are the sorts of 
intangible benefits; everybody loves to bitch about 
the government, but hey, you know what?  The 
government working with private industry can be a 
real catalyst.  I‘m proud of all the seminars that we 
did, and the books that we published from those 
seminars, they were a lot of work but they were 
definitely worth all the work we put into them.  My 
point always was, you can give the greatest talk in the 
world but it‘s like building this really cool campfire: 
everybody sits around it and later has great memories 
of the campfire, but they can‘t put everything back 
together the way it was again.  But when you write 
something, you‘ve got it.  It‘s there.  You can go back 
to it over and over again.  I can‘t tell you how many 
times, when I‘ve wrote something for one of our 
seminars, and now it‘s about 6 or 7 years later, and 
I‘m thinking such-and-such happened, it went this 
way or that way, and I go back to the seminar paper 
that I wrote, and I‘m like ―I‘m completely wrong‖ 
because I‘ve just forgotten!  But the ability to go back 
to some resource that you or somebody else has 
created, it really is pretty neat, I‘m really proud of 
that. I‘m proud of all the work that everyone at the 
park did, but I‘m also proud of the little contribution 
I made to the landscape rehabilitation of the 
battlefield.  
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If you had one more year left before you retired, 
what would you try to accomplish at GNMP? 
 
I think probably what I would have done if I had not 
retired is I would have tried to become Chief of 
Interpretation at Gettysburg.  I would have used my 
time there to allow some of our really creative people 
to build upon what we have already done.  Because, 
what I‘d be looking for is, you‘re going to retire, this 
isn‘t about you, it‘s about the park and those people 
that come after you.  Helping those people build the 
foundation for taking the park further into the 21st 
century, building that solid foundation for the park 
and empowering those people who are the creative 
ones and the hard workers.  I would have done 
collaborations with the Gettysburg Foundation.  I 
would have tried to redo a thing we had done before, 
where we brought Dr. Carmichael in to do a 
workshop with people from all the Civil War parks 
in the North Atlantic region.  I‘d do something like 
that again with academics, because I think that 
academics can learn some things from public 
historians, but public historians can learn a lot from 
academics because the difference between the two of 
us is we are doing research for the next program 
coming up, but academics are on the cutting edge of 
research.  So that we can learn from the research 
they are doing and apply it to our public history.  I 
would have tried to build a greater bridge between 
those two worlds, the academic world and the public 
history world because I think there‘s a lot to be 
gained by doing that.  I would have used the 
Gettysburg Foundation however it could be used to 
help facilitate that.  The other thing I would have 
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definitely done would be to work with the 
Foundation to see if we could get research grants.  
Years ago when Eastern National used to run our 
bookstore, they had a program where you could 
apply for research grants.  We got a few of them, and 
we sent researchers out to state and county historical 
societies, college repositories, and we got some 
unbelievable Gettysburg primary source material, just 
phenomenal stuff.  In some places we just scratched 
the surface because there‘s a ton of it out there that 
you‘ve got to have time and money to go and get, 
and you have to look at it, you just can‘t write them 
to send you such-and-such.  That would have been 
another thing to work on.  The reality would have 
been I wouldn‘t have gotten any of that done in a 
year! [laughter].  In five years maybe I would have 
gotten some of it done… 
 
What is your most vivid memory of the Gettysburg 
150th commemoration events at the park this 
summer? 
 
Three things just stick in my mind.  One is the Last 
March of the Iron Brigade.  The whole event was an 
incredible experience unlike anything I‘ve ever had 
at the park, and I‘ve had some really cool 
experiences at the park.  When we got up near the 
North Carolina monument, I was at the very front of 
the column and I looked back and the tail end of the 
marchers was still at the Emmitsburg Road.  It was 
amazing, and how fantastic the visitors were in 
keeping together and forming up.  It was really pretty 
magical.   The living history group that we had [the 
Liberty Rifles], that‘s a great example.  Take the 
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Liberty Rifles out: not the same program.  I don‘t 
care how good Dan Welch and I could have been, it 
would not have been the same program.  Those guys 
made that program, they gave it an energy it wouldn‘t 
have been there otherwise.  The second thing is of 
course would have been Pickett‘s Charge.  It was a 
giant risk and a gamble.  We did a lot of planning on 
it to organize the visitors so that the visitors would 
maneuver to the operational plan I drew up for 
everybody.  We were following the same tactical plan 
that the Confederates did in the attack.  Fry‘s brigade 
is the unit of direction, so that Garnett guided on 
that, Kemper guided on Garnett, and Armistead 
stayed 200 yards behind Kemper.  And everything 
worked out, it was amazing.  I expected we might get 
about 10,000 people on it, we ended up with about 
40,000.  I had a lot of worries about it.  I was 
concerned that (1) it could get out of control, and (2) 
it could become a Confederate love fest, which I did 
not want it to be.  But I was willing to run the risk 
that there would be a lot of Confederate battle flags 
out there, and I know that‘s controversial for the 
NPS to be holding an event, with all these 
Confederate flags flying around and celebrating the 
Confederacy 150 years afterwards.   That‘s not really 
what we should be doing.  The other part of me was, 
I‘m trusting that people are going to be respectful.  
We tried to set up an event where you could walk 
across that field with a Confederate flag if you want, 
you have a right to fly any flag you want really out 
there, but there were a lot of people I knew who had 
ancestors, or they were from states that these men 
had come from, and all they wanted to do was to 
walk across that ground at that time.  They didn‘t 
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want to celebrate the Confederate cause, they just 
wanted to remember their ancestors and what they 
had gone through, and I wanted those people to have 
that opportunity just as I wanted people on Cemetery 
Ridge to have the opportunity to be present and an 
active participant, so that everyone involved was a 
participant rather than an onlooker.  And that 
worked, it ended up working out.  We had some 
little incidents with some folks who thought the Civil 
War was still going on [laughter].  And the last thing 
is, I don‘t know why this sticks in my mind: Todd 
Bolton was in charge of all the interpretive programs 
out in the field.  Ernie Price was my deputy, because 
Ernie is going to be doing the 150th anniversary at 
Appomattox Court House.  So the three of us on 
July 2nd are trying to get out and visit all of the key 
moment stations.  It was almost impossible, there 
were people everywhere, all over the place.  But the 
great thing was, everywhere you went everybody was 
in such a good mood, and it was humid as hell and 
threatening rain, but everybody was having such a 
good time.  I think part of it was we tried to plan so 
that there was always stuff for people to be doing, 
something coming up or something happening.  You 
weren‘t just wandering around, you had to get to the 
next station or the next hike or there was something 
you wanted to get to.  And we got up to Little Round 
Top finally, I took us about an hour and a half to get 
up there, and we pulled up in the car, and I see Jim 
Flook, one of our seasonal Rangers, and he‘s just 
drenched in sweat with the biggest smile on his face, 
he‘s just beaming.  He said ―Allison did the first talk, 
and she had 200 people.‖  That was 9:00 in the 
morning!  Just the look of excitement on Jim‘s face 
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and all the visitors we ran into, it was just an amazing 
event.  So those things always leap into my mind 
when I think of the 150th. 
 
When the Civil War sesquicentennial celebrations 
are over in 2015, what comes next for Civil War 
historians? 
 
I think if we‘ve done our job the events that we had 
should get another generation excited about visiting 
Civil War battlefields, and understanding how the 
Civil War relates to their life.  They become the next 
generation, that then brings their kids.  So that in a 
way, you always have to have something for a 
generation that energizes people and reconnects 
them with their history. We are clearly a country that 
just keeps moving on, we march on and we don‘t 
look back, generally, and we often times don‘t like to 
be reminded of where we came from because of 
assorted parts of our past.  Past 2015, what you have 
to do is to stay creative.  You have to continue to do 
some of the traditional things you‘ve always done that 
have connected with the visiting public, but you also 
have to find ways that connect with a public that 
maybe doesn‘t see the relevancy in a battle walk, but 
they would like to know what happened on the 2nd 
day of the battle.  To me, the future is (and I know 
the Park Service is looking at wayside exhibits and 
things like that) for the Park Service to recruit a new 
batch of interpreters who can do the interpretation 
on the field, but have the skills to carry the battlefield 
out through blogs, through Facebook, through apps, 
that enable people anywhere in the world to connect 
with us, because that‘s the way you‘re going to get 
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people really energized about wanting to come here 
one day.  You‘re always having to go back and make 
history interesting and relevant.  When we started 
our blog at the park, some people said it‘s got to be 
really short, like a paragraph.  I said that‘s absolutely 
wrong.  For some blogs, you‘re right.  But for this 
kind of blog if it doesn‘t have something of 
substance, they‘re not going to read it.  The person 
that‘s going to come to this blog is interested, not just 
cruising around looking at stuff, and it‘s got to be 
worth their time.  You have to tell the stories about 
this park that are the stories you couldn‘t tell on an 
interpretive program, or stories that move people to 
say ―you know what?  We need to go back down to 
Gettysburg this summer.‖  That‘s what you‘re trying 
to do through social media, those sorts of things.  
Some people who think in traditional terms, look at 
a Ranger sitting at a computer and say, get that guy 
out behind the desk.  So you get that well-trained 
Ranger out at a desk (which a volunteer could do), 
and he sees maybe 30, 40, 60 people on a two-hour 
shift.  However, if they stayed at that computer, and 
completed that blog post or Facebook post, that just 
reached 25,000 people.  Which was the more 
efficient use of their time?  That‘s how I think you 
have to look at it. 
 
What is next for Scott Hartwig? 
 
Working on volume two of the Antietam campaign.  
I have a couple of ideas for other books after that 
once I finish it.  I‘d like to be able to do some 
writing.  I love writing, I like the research, and it was 
getting to the point in my later years at the park 
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where I didn‘t have time to write. 
 
Any advice for the next generation of historians? 
 
Don‘t get so mired down in the academia, or the 
bureaucracy if you‘re in the public history world, 
where you forget why we‘re doing this.  Why are we 
interested in history?  Why do we want to learn 
about history, why do we want to share what we 
know with people?  It comes back again to making it 
relevant and telling those stories that move people.  
There are all sorts of academics that have criticized 
Bruce Catton and Stephen Ambrose and James 
McPherson over the years because they reach a 
broad audience, but I would say: how do you do 
really good history and reach a broad audience?  
That‘s your challenge.  If you‘re only preaching to a 
tiny group of people, it really doesn‘t matter 
anymore, they won‘t find any value in it.  If people 
don‘t visit the parks and find value in the parks, 
we‘re failing.  Do academic history, but also make 
history relevant for the broader masses out there that 
don‘t really understand it.   
 
